



IDA's Compilation of CRPD Committee's Concluding Observations

*Article 33 CRPD
(National implementation and
monitoring)*

April 2024

Article 33 - National implementation and monitoring

- 1. States Parties, in accordance with their system of organization, shall designate one or more focal points within government for matters relating to the implementation of the present Convention, and shall give due consideration to the establishment or designation of a coordination mechanism within government to facilitate related action in different sectors and at different levels.*
- 2. States Parties shall, in accordance with their legal and administrative systems, maintain, strengthen, designate or establish within the State Party, a framework, including one or more independent mechanisms, as appropriate, to promote, protect and monitor implementation of the present Convention. When designating or establishing such a mechanism, States Parties shall take into account the principles relating to the status and functioning of national institutions for protection and promotion of human rights.*
- 3. Civil society, in particular persons with disabilities and their representative organizations, shall be involved and participate fully in the monitoring process.*

AZERBAIJAN (2024)
BAHRAIN (2024)
COSTA RICA (2024)
KAZAKHSTAN (2024)
NICARAGUA (2024)
SWEDEN (2024)
ZAMBIA (2024)
ANDORRA (2023)
AUSTRIA (2023)
GERMANY (2023)
ISRAEL (2023)
MALAWI (2023)
MAURITANIA (2023)
MONGOLIA (2023)
PARAGUAY (2023)
ANGOLA (2023)
ARGENTINA (2023)
GEORGIA (2023)
PERU (2023)
TOGO (2023)
TUNISIA (2023)
BANGLADESH (2022)
CHINA (2022)
INDONESIA (2022)
JAPAN (2022)
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (2022)
NEW ZEALAND (2022)
SINGAPORE (2022)

HUNGARY (2022)
JAMAICA (2022)
MEXICO (2022)
SWITZERLAND (2022)
VENEZUELA (2022)
DJIBOUTI (2021)
FRANCE (2021)
ESTONIA (2021)
ALBANIA (2019)
AUSTRALIA (2019)
ECUADOR (2019)
EL SALVADOR (2019)
GREECE (2019)
INDIA (2019)
IRAQ (2019)
KUWAIT (2019)
MYANMAR (2019)
CUBA (2019)
NIGER (2019)
RWANDA (2019)
SAUDI ARABIA (2019)
SENEGAL (2019)
SPAIN (2019)
VANUATU (2019)
ALGERIA (2018)
MALTA (2018)
PHILIPPINES (2018)
POLAND (2018)

SOUTH AFRICA (2018)
NORTH MACEDONIA (2018)
HAITI (2018)
NEPAL (2018)
OMAN (2018)
RUSSIAN FEDERATION (2018)
SEYCHELLES (2018)
SLOVENIA (2018)
SUDAN (2018)
LATVIA (2017)
LUXEMBOURG (2017)
MONTENEGRO (2017)
MOROCCO (2017)
PANAMA (2017)
**UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
(2017)**
ARMENIA (2017)
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (2017)
CANADA (2017)
CYPRUS (2017)
HONDURAS (2017)
IRAN (ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF) (2017)
JORDAN (2017)
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA (2017)
BOLIVIA (2016)
COLOMBIA (2016)
ETHIOPIA (2016)
GUATEMALA (2016)

ITALY (2016)
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (2016)
URUGUAY (2016)
CHILE (2016)
LITHUANIA (2016)
PORTUGAL (2016)
SERBIA (2016)
SLOVAKIA (2016)
THAILAND (2016)
UGANDA (2016)
BRAZIL (2015)
EUROPEAN UNION (2015)
GABON (2015)
KENYA (2015)
MAURITIUS (2015)
QATAR (2015)
UKRAINE (2015)
COOK ISLANDS (2015)
CROATIA (2015)
CZECH REPUBLIC (2015)
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (2015)
GERMANY (2015)
MONGOLIA (2015)
TURKMENISTAN (2015)
DENMARK (2014)
REPUBLIC OF KOREA (2014)
BELGIUM (2014)
ECUADOR (2014)

MEXICO (2014)
SWEDEN (2014)
COSTA RICA (2014)
AUSTRALIA (2013)
AUSTRIA (2013)
EL SALVADOR (2013)
PARAGUAY (2013)
ARGENTINA (2012)
CHINA (2012)
HUNGARY (2012)
PERU (2012)
TUNISIA (2010)

Please note there are no recommendations in the Concluding Observations on art. 33 on Norway, New Zealand, Azerbaijan (2014) and Spain.

Azerbaijan (2024)

69. The Committee is concerned about:

- (a) The lack of sectorial focal points for the implementation of the Convention;
- (b) The absence of independent monitoring of the implementation of the Convention compliant with the Paris Principles;
- (c) The absence of mechanisms to ensure involvement of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in monitoring the Convention.

70. Recalling its Guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, included in the annex of its Rules of procedure, the Committee recommends that the State party:

- (a) Designate focal points within government, including across all branches and levels of government, with authority to implement the Convention;**
- (b) Designate an independent monitoring framework for the Convention, including the participation of the Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) of the Republic of Azerbaijan, in line with the Paris Principles to ensure it can undertake transparent and independent monitoring and receive A status accreditation by the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA);**
- (c) Ensure participation of all persons with disabilities including those in rural areas and the diversity of their representative organizations in monitoring the Convention.**

Bahrain (2024)¹

66. The Committee is deeply concerned about:

- (a) The absence of a national coordination mechanism to follow up on the implementation of the Convention and provide technical support to the executive authorities.
- (b) The absence of an independent national mechanism to monitor the implementation of the Convention at the national level.
- (c) The lack of support provided to the national human rights institution to enable it to monitor the implementation of human rights covenants and conventions, including the Convention, at the national level.

67. The Committee recommends that the State party should:

- (a) Establish a national coordinating mechanism to support the implementation of the Convention at the national level, ensuring the effective involvement of persons with disabilities and their organizations.**
- (b) Establish an independent national mechanism with the active participation of persons with disabilities and their organizations to monitor the implementation of the Convention**
- (c) Strengthen the national human rights institution to upgrade its status to (a) and enable it to play its role in accordance with the Paris Principles in monitoring the implementation of the Convention at the national level in close consultation and with the active participation of persons with disabilities and their organizations**

Costa Rica (2024)

57. El Comité observa con preocupación:

- a) La falta de medidas para fortalecer a la Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República para cumplir su rol como Mecanismo Nacional de Seguimiento de la Convención, dotándolo de recursos humanos capacitados y de los recursos financieros necesarios;
- b) El debilitamiento del CONAPDIS por insuficiente asignación presupuestaria, y por el proyecto de la ampliación de sus funciones al existir la intención de que el Instituto de Desarrollo Humano e Inclusión Social pase a formar parte de la CONAPDIS;

¹ When compiling the recommendations, the Concluding Observations were only available in Arabic. This document includes an automated translation to English by [DeepL](#).

c) La falta de información sobre los avances del rediseño del Manual del Macroproceso de Defensa y sobre la existencia de un proceso abreviado y accesible para que las personas con discapacidad puedan presentar sus quejas ante la Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República.

58. El Comité recomienda al Estado parte:

a) Fortalecer a la Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República para el seguimiento de la Convención, con personal capacitado, recursos financieros e infraestructura accesible y de diseño universal para que pueda ejercer eficazmente su mandato, y garantizar la plena participación de las personas con discapacidad y las organizaciones que las representan en el proceso de supervisión y monitoreo;

b) La adopción de medidas y mecanismos para fortalecer la arquitectura y gestión institucional del CONAPDIS a través de la implementación y evaluación de instrumentos de planificación como el Plan Estratégico Institucional (PEI 2023-2027), la Política Nacional de Discapacidad (PONADIS 2024-2030) y su plan de acción, instrumentos alineados al marco normativo internacional y nacional en materia de derechos humanos de las personas con discapacidad, la perspectiva de igualdad de género, el análisis interseccional y el enfoque territorial;

c) Velar por que se difunda ampliamente el avance de la aplicación del Manual del Macroproceso de Defensa implementado por la Defensoría de los Habitantes de la República en la tramitación de denuncias.

[Kazakhstan \(2024\)](#)

69. The Committee welcomes the establishment of the Coordination Council on the social protection of persons with disabilities at the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which includes representatives from all state bodies and civil society organizations. The Committee is, however, concerned that:

(a) The lack of inclusive budgeting indicators to determine the significance of disability rights in the national agenda;

(b) The Commissioner for Human Rights lacks independence to monitor the implementation of the Convention;

(c) The lack of effective participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the implementation and monitoring processes of the Convention.

70. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Allocate national and local budgets with indicators to promote the implementation of the Convention;

(b) Ensure the functional, budgetary and operational independency of the Commissioner for Human Rights, in line with the Paris Principles, strengthen its capacity to undertake transparent and independent monitoring of the implementation of the Convention, and apply for review by the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) with the aim of being accredited with A status. The Committee also recommends to take into account its Guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, included in the annex of its Rules of procedure.

(c) Ensure the full participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in monitoring the Convention, including all types of impairments.

[Nicaragua \(2024\)](#)

14. El Comité toma nota de las campañas de sensibilización y promoción de los derechos de las personas con discapacidad, así como de la capacitación proporcionada a funcionarios públicos. Sin embargo, le preocupa que en la percepción pública de la discapacidad siga prevaleciendo un modelo asistencialista y médico, y que mujeres, niñas y niños con discapacidad sigan enfrentando violencia.

15. El Comité recomienda al Estado parte que adopte una estrategia nacional permanente a fin de promover un modelo de la discapacidad basado en los derechos humanos, con enfoque de género y edad entre los medios de comunicación, los funcionarios públicos, profesionales del sector de la salud y de la justicia, la policía, el público en general y las familias de las personas con discapacidad, con la participación efectiva de las personas con discapacidad en su formulación, aplicación, y evaluación periódica.

Sweden (2024)

71. The Committee notes with appreciation the establishment of the Swedish Institute for Human Rights in January 2022 as a monitoring mechanism and its application for membership in the Global Alliance for National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI). However, the Committee is concerned that the Institute deems the probability to be afforded "A"-status "good, but not certain", and lists concerns about the financing, appointment, remuneration and dismissal criteria for board members.

72. The Committee recommends that the State party ensure that the National Human Rights Institute is provided with adequate financial, human and technical resources and a legislative and regulatory framework in full compliance with the Principles Relating to the Status of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (the Paris Principles).

73. The Committee is concerned about the insufficient involvement and participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the monitoring process by the National Human Rights Institute.

74. The Committee recommends that the National Human Rights Institute establish procedures and protocols for the involvement and full participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in its monitoring processes.

Zambia (2024)

65. The Committee notes with appreciation that the Human Rights Commission of Zambia (HRCZ) has been reviewed in 2018 and re-accredited with an "A" Status by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI). However, it notes with concern:

(a) The lack of a formal recognition of the national human rights institution to monitor the implementation of the Convention;

(b) The insufficient human, technical and financial resources provided to focal points to enable them to fulfil their responsibilities, as well as lack of coordination between the focal points and the Zambia Agency for Persons with Disabilities;

(c) That persons with disabilities have not been adequately involved through their representative organizations in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention.

66. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Implement the recommendations of the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) for the National Human Rights Commission of Zambia to ensure that it functions effectively and independently and discharges its mandate in full compliance with the Paris Principles. The Committee further recommends that the State party designate the Human Rights Commission of Zambia as the National monitoring mechanism for the implementation of the Convention. The Committee also recommends that the State party ensure the full involvement and participation of persons with disabilities, especially women with disabilities, and their representative organizations in the monitoring of the implementation of the Convention, including by providing the necessary funding;

(b) Build the capacity of focal points and equip them with sufficient powers and increased human, technical and financial resources to fulfil their responsibilities under article 33 of the Convention, as well as enhance the coordination between focal points and the Zambia Agency for Persons with Disabilities;

(c) Take measures to ensure that persons with disabilities, including women and girls with disabilities, are meaningfully involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the Convention through their representative organizations.

[Andorra \(2023\)](#)

67. The Committee notes with concern the following:

(a) There is no monitoring mechanism that meets the requirements of the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights (the Paris Principles);

(b) The State party indicates that the monitoring mechanism to supervise the implementation of the Convention is the Andorran Federation of Associations of Persons with Disabilities (FAAD);

(c) Persons with disabilities have not been adequately involved through their representative organizations in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention.

68. The Committee, taking into account its guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee, recommends that the State party:

(a) Establish a national human rights institution that meets the requirements of the Paris Principles, and ensures that it has sufficient human, technical and financial resources to fulfil its mandate, including monitoring the implementation of the Convention;

(b) Raise awareness about the different roles of the Andorran Federation of Associations of Persons with Disabilities (FAAD) and an independent monitoring mechanism in line with the Convention;

(c) Ensure that persons with disabilities, including women and children with disabilities, and their representative organizations are meaningfully involved in monitoring the implementation of the Convention.

[Austria \(2023\)](#)

73. The Committee notes that the Austrian Ombudsman Board (AOB) was reaccredited with A-status by GANHRI, but the Committee would draw attention to the appraisal by the Sub-Committee on Accreditation that the selection and appointment process laid down in Federal Constitutional Law is not sufficiently broad and transparent and that it issued several recommendations.

74. The Committee recommends the State party address the recommendations issued by the Sub-Committee on Accreditation of GANHRI and strengthen the AOB accordingly.

[Germany \(2023\)](#)

73. The Committee is concerned about:

(a) The insufficient human, technical and financial resources of focal points to fulfil their responsibilities and the limited involvement of organizations of persons with disabilities in the implementation of the Convention;

(b) The lack of mechanisms to monitor the implementation of the Convention at the Länder level.

74. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Build the capacity of and equip focal points with sufficient powers and increased human, technical and financial resources to fulfil their responsibilities under article 33 of the Convention, and ensure that persons with disabilities and their representative organizations are effectively involved in monitoring the implementation of the Convention;

(b) Enact legislation establishing permanent independent monitoring mechanisms at the Länder level, in full compliance with the Paris Principles, and allocate human, technical and secure financial resources to support their mandates.

[Israel \(2023\)](#)

69. The Committee is concerned that:

- (a) The Commission for Equal Rights of Persons with Disabilities lacks authority to ensure mainstreaming of the human rights of persons with disabilities across all government portfolios;
- (b) The Commission for Equal Rights of Persons with Disabilities lacks independence to monitor the implementation of the Convention and does not meet the Principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (Paris Principles);
- (c) The diversity of organisations of persons with disabilities in monitoring the Convention is limited.

70. The Committee recommends that the State party:

- (a) Strengthen the authority and competencies of the Commission for Equal Rights of Persons with Disabilities to ensure disability is mainstreamed across all government programmes;**
- (b) Establish an independent monitoring framework under article 33 (2) of the Convention that complies with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles), and take into account the Committee's rules of procedure (see CRPD/1/Rev.1, annex) relating to the role and engagement of independent monitoring frameworks;**
- (c) Ensure full participation of the diversity of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the monitoring process. The State party should provide inclusive and accessible methodologies, and human, financial and technical resources for periodic monitoring.**

[Malawi \(2023\)](#)

67. The Committee is concerned about:

- (a) The limited information about the capacity and coordination mechanisms of the disability focal points at the community level and that the National Advisory and Coordinating Committee on Disability through which persons with disabilities are expected to participate in the monitoring and implementation of the Convention is not operational;
- (b) Information indicating challenges for the Malawi Human Rights Commission to operate freely and about the limited funding and the serious understaffing of this entity, which undermine its independent monitoring role of human rights, including in the realm of disability rights;
- (c) The absence of measures to ensure participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in monitoring the rights recognized in the Convention.

68. The Committee, recalling its guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex), recommends that the State party:

- (a) Ensure the continuing functioning of the National Advisory and Coordinating Committee on Disability, appoint disability focal points at the community level and ensure appropriate training and coordination mechanisms to strengthen their role in implementing the Convention;**
- (b) Strengthen the Malawi Human Rights Commission to perform its independent monitoring role under article 33 (2), including by allocating appropriate funding, ensuring its ability to freely determine its priorities and activities, filling up the over 50 percent vacant positions, and that it operates in accordance with the Principles relating to the status of national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights (the Paris Principles);**
- (c) Ensure the provision of appropriate resources for persons with disabilities and their representative organizations, including support through independent and self-managed**

funding, to enable them to meaningfully take part in the independent monitoring of the Convention and to work directly with the Human Rights Commission as the designated independent monitoring mechanism.

Mauritania (2023)

57. The Committee notes with concern about the lack of progress made towards the implementation of recommendations of the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) made in 2020 during the re-accreditation of the National Human Rights Commission of Mauritania (CNDH), to further strengthen its mandate in full compliance with the Paris Principles.

58. The Committee recommends that the State party implement the recommendations of the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) to continue strengthening its efforts to address all human rights violations, to ensure that its website is accessible to all, to advocate for an appropriate level of funding, to ensure the appropriate gender balance in its composition and to engage with the civil society, in order to ensure that the National Human Rights Commission of Mauritania (CNDH) functions effectively and independently and discharges its mandate in full compliance with the Paris Principles.

59. The Committee notes with concern that the State party has not designated an independent monitoring mechanism for the follow-up and evaluation of the implementation of the Convention with a budget and designated functions that involves the effective and independent participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations.

60. The Committee recommends that the State party take action, bearing in mind the guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex), to establish an independent monitoring mechanism with a budget and designated functions for monitoring of the implementation of the Convention.

Mongolia (2023)

65. The Committee notes with concern about the lack of progress made towards the implementation of recommendations of the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) made in 2021 during the re-accreditation of the National Human Rights Commission of Mongolia (NHRCM), to ensure the formalization of a clear, transparent and participatory selection and appointment process.

66. The Committee recommends that the State party implement the recommendations of the GANHRI to continue advocating for the formalization of a clear, transparent and participatory selection and appointment processes and enhance diversity and pluralism, in the composition of its Council, in order to ensure that the National Human Rights Commission of Mongolia (NHRCM) functions effectively and independently and discharges its mandate in full compliance with the Paris Principles.

67. The Committee notes with concern that the State party has not designated an independent monitoring mechanism for the follow-up and evaluation of the implementation of the Convention with a budget and designated functions that involves the effective and independent participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations.

68. The Committee recommends that the State party take action, bearing in mind the guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex), to establish an independent monitoring mechanism with a budget and designated functions for monitoring of the implementation of the Convention.

69. The Committee is concerned that despite the establishment of the National Council for Ensuring the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, with Sub-councils at ministries and Branch-councils in the capital city districts and provinces, there is a lack of focal points in different ministries to mainstream the rights of persons with disabilities.

70. The Committee recommends that the State party clearly designate one or more focal points within the Government with the sufficient authority, human resources and budget allocations to carry out their mandate for ensuring that rights of persons with disabilities are mainstreamed across all policies and programme.

Paraguay (2023)

59. Al Comité le preocupa:

a) La falta de formalización y aplicación de un proceso de selección y nombramiento claro, transparente y participativo del Defensor del Pueblo, la carencia de financiación adecuada para llevar a cabo su mandato, así como de un mandato explícito para alentar la ratificación de los instrumentos regionales e internacionales de derechos humanos o la adhesión a ellos y cooperar eficazmente con los sistemas regionales e internacionales de derechos humanos;

b) La falta de un mecanismo de monitoreo independiente que cumpla con los Principios de París, incumpliendo con la Resolución Ministerial N.º 1655/15 del Estado parte;

c) La falta de avances en el fortalecimiento de capacidades técnicas de los puntos focales para el seguimiento de la implementación de la Convención.

60. El Comité recomienda que el Estado parte tenga en cuenta sus directrices sobre los marcos independientes de supervisión y su participación en la labor del Comité y que:

a) Fortalezca la figura del Defensor del Pueblo para que pueda cumplir su mandato de manera eficaz e independiente de conformidad con los Principios de París y siguiendo las recomendaciones del Sub-Comité de Acreditación de GANHRI, y que solicite el apoyo y el asesoramiento del ACNUDH en el proceso;

b) Establezca un mecanismo de monitoreo independiente, dentro de la Defensoría del Pueblo, en cumplimiento de la Resolución Ministerial N.º 1655/15, con los recursos humanos y financieros necesarios para que pueda ejercer eficazmente su mandato y garantizar la estrecha participación de las personas con discapacidad y las organizaciones que las representan en el proceso de supervisión y monitoreo;

c) Acelere el fortalecimiento de las capacidades técnicas de los puntos focales para el seguimiento de la Convención.

Angola (2023)

57. The Committee is concerned that:

(a) While noting the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsman as an institution, the institution does not meet the requirements of the Principles Relating to the Status of National Human Rights Institutions (Paris Principles);

(b) Persons with disabilities through their representative organisations have not been adequately involved in the implementation and monitoring of the CRPD.

58. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Consider making necessary adjustments to ensure that the office of the Ombudsman meet the requirements of the Paris Principles, or establishing a separate independent National Human Rights Institution meeting those requirements;

(b) Ensure that persons with disabilities through their representative organisations, including women and girls with disabilities are meaningfully involved in monitoring the implementation of the Convention.

Argentina (2023)

63. Al Comité le preocupa la falta de un mecanismo de monitoreo independiente que cumpla con los Principios de París, y la falta de designación formal del titular de la Defensoría del Pueblo de la Nación Argentina.

64. Teniendo en cuenta sus directrices sobre los marcos independientes de supervisión y su participación en la labor del Comité, el Comité recomienda al Estado parte:

- a) Establecer un mecanismo independiente de seguimiento en cumplimiento de los Principios de París, con los recursos humanos y financieros necesarios para que pueda ejercer eficazmente su mandato y garantizar la plena participación de las personas con discapacidad y las organizaciones que las representan en el proceso de supervisión;
- b) Acelerar la designación del titular de la Defensoría del Pueblo mediante un proceso de selección y nominación claro, transparente y participativo, considerando las recomendaciones emitidas en 2017 por el comité subsidiario de la Alianza Global de Instituciones Nacionales de Derechos Humanos.

Georgia (2023)

65. The Committee observes with concern:

- (a) The limited human, technical and financial resources of the Inter-Agency Coordination Committee for the implementation of the Convention;
- (b) That permanent participation of organizations of persons with disabilities at the independent monitoring mechanism has yet to be developed;
- (c) The lack of implementation of the recommendations issued by the Public Defender's of Georgia concerning the rights of persons with disabilities.

66. The Committee recommends that the State party:

- (a) Strengthen the human, technical and financial resources of the Inter-Agency Coordination Committee, build the capacity of focal points to mainstream the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and levels of government, and strengthen their mandates with respect to the implementation of the Convention;**
- (b) Increase resources for the development of the monitoring mandate of the Public Defender of Georgia, to provide for accessible information and methodologies in its work and to ensure that persons with disabilities and their representative organizations are effectively involved in monitoring the implementation of the Convention, including during situations of risk and emergencies and in the recovery period;**
- (c) Take into account the Committee's guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee and strengthen the mandate and the role of the Public Defender's Office by enforcing its recommendations and facilitating unrestricted access to information in its monitoring obligations.**

Peru (2023)

66. Al Comité le preocupa que:

- a) El CONADIS, en su papel de órgano de coordinación gubernamental y punto focal de la discapacidad, no está operando plenamente, ya que no se ha nombrado un nuevo presidente desde que expiró el nombramiento del último en octubre de 2022, no se ha establecido el Consejo Asesor, ni se han elegido representantes de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil;
- b) En algunos gobiernos regionales y locales, la Oficina de Atención a las Personas con Discapacidad (OMAPED/OREDIS) no está operativa a pesar de existir una obligación expresa en la ley, y la mayoría de los gobiernos regionales y locales no utilizan el 0,5% de su presupuesto asignado para su funcionamiento;
- c) Pese a la designación de un Mecanismo independiente para promover, proteger y supervisar la aplicación de la Convención, dentro de la Defensoría del Pueblo de Perú, no se han incrementado sus recursos para llevar a cabo sus funciones y actividades en lo que respecta a la promoción, la protección y el seguimiento de los derechos consagrados en la Convención.

67. El Comité recomienda que el Estado parte tenga en cuenta sus directrices sobre los marcos independientes de supervisión y su participación en la labor del Comité y que:

- a) Fortalezca el CONADIS, mediante un mayor presupuesto para que pueda coordinar y apoyar eficazmente la aplicación de la Convención y que finalice a la brevedad el**

procedimiento de elección del presidente, la conformación del Consejo Consultivo y la elección de los representantes de las organizaciones de la sociedad civil;

b) Asegure que los gobiernos regionales y locales cumplan con la implementación de las OREDIS y OMAPED en sus respectivas jurisdicciones y las doten de los recursos adecuados para su labor y cree mecanismos, incluyendo el apoyo técnico, para asegurar que los gobiernos regionales y municipales utilicen el presupuesto asignado para su trabajo;

c) Refuerce los recursos humanos, técnicos y financieros asignados a la Defensoría del Pueblo de Perú y su mecanismo de monitoreo independiente para que pueda cumplir su mandato relativo al seguimiento de la aplicación de la Convención de forma eficaz e independiente, en coordinación con las organizaciones de personas con discapacidad.

Togo (2023)

63. The Committee notes with appreciation that the Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme (CNDH) has been reviewed in 2019 and accredited with an "A" Status by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI). However, the Committee is concerned at the limited effectiveness of the National Commission to monitor the implementation of the Convention, including the lack of participation of representatives of persons with disabilities in the monitoring process coordination of this Commission with representative organizations of persons with disabilities.

64. The Committee recommends that the State party implement the recommendations of the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) and strengthen the National Human Rights Commission to ensure that it functions effectively and independently and discharges its mandate in full compliance with the Paris Principles. The Committee also recommends that the State party ensure the full involvement and participation of persons with disabilities, especially women with disabilities, and their representative organizations in the monitoring of the implementation of the Convention, including by providing the necessary funding.

Tunisia (2023)

59. The Committee is concerned that there is still no clearly designated focal point for the implementation of the Convention in the State party. It is also concerned that the National Human Rights Commission which is expected to follow up on the implementation and monitoring of the Convention is not an independent mechanism. It is further concerned that no clear strategies have been put in place for the participation of persons with disabilities through their representative organisations in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention, as required by the Convention.

60. The Committee recommends the State party to:

(a) Clearly designate one or more focal points within the government with sufficient authority, human resource and budget allocation to carry out their mandate for ensuring that disability is mainstreamed across all policies and programmes;

(b) Establish without further delay the National Human Rights Commission and provide it with a strong mandate to promote and protect the rights of persons with disabilities and adopt measures to promote, protect and monitor implementation of the Convention, taking into account the principles relating to the status and function of national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights (Paris Principles), by paying particular attention to its independence, autonomy, appropriate budget and human resource allocations;

(c) Adopt measures to fully involve civil society, in particular persons with disabilities, and their representative organizations, including those of particular women and girls with disabilities to ensure a gender perspective, in the monitoring and implementation process and the preparation of reports in compliance with the State party's obligations under ratified international human rights treaties.

Bangladesh (2022)

63. The Committee notes with concern the insufficient clarity on the focal points on disabilities and their mandate and the lack of an identifiable substantive independent monitoring framework to promote, protect and monitor implementation of the Convention that meets the standards of the Paris Principles, along with sufficient budgetary and human resources to enable it fulfil its mandate and the limited involvement and participation of persons with disabilities, through their representative organizations, in the implementation and monitoring process of the Convention.

64. The Committee recommends that the State party clarify the focal points within government and define their roles, as well as identify an independent monitoring framework that meets the mandate of the Paris Principles and that is provided with the necessary budgetary and human resources to carry out its work of promoting and monitoring implementation of the convention and ensure the active participation of civil society organisations, particularly representative organisations of persons with disabilities, in the promotion and monitoring of the convention, with sufficient budgetary allocations to carry out their work.

China (2022)

60. The Committee notes with concern:

(a) The lack of information provided on the effectiveness of the Disabled Persons' Work Committee of the State Council in mainstreaming the Convention across all sectors and levels of government;

(b) The absence of an independent mechanism appointed to monitor the implementation of the Convention;

(c) The absence of effective involvement of persons with disabilities and their organizations in monitoring the implementation of the Convention.

61. The Committee recommends that the State party take into account its guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, Annex) and:

(a) **Recalling the commitment made in their Universal Periodic Review (2018), establish an independent mechanism for monitoring human rights in compliance with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights (the Paris Principles), with an associated time frame and including a specific mechanism for monitoring the rights of persons with disabilities;**

(b) **Strengthen the State Council Working Committee on Disability, responsible for coordinating the implementation of the Convention; build the capacity of focal points to mainstream the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and levels of government; and strengthen their mandates with respect to implementing the Convention;**

(c) **Ensure that persons with disabilities and the whole range of their representative organizations, including those operating independently of the China Disabled Persons' Federation, are effectively involved in monitoring the implementation of the Convention, including during the COVID-19 pandemic.**

Hong-Kong (2022)

77. The Committee notes with concern:

(a) The absence of an independent mechanism appointed to monitor the implementation of the Convention;

(b) The absence of effective involvement of persons with disabilities and their organizations in monitoring the implementation of the Convention.

78. The Committee recommends that Hong Kong SAR, China take into account its guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, Annex) and:

(a) Establish an independent mechanism for monitoring human rights with a broad mandate in full compliance with the Paris Principles;

(b) Ensure that persons with disabilities and the whole range of their representative organizations are effectively involved in monitoring the implementation of the Convention, including during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Macao

88. The Committee notes with concern:

(a) The absence of an independent mechanism appointed to monitor the implementation of the Convention;

(b) The absence of effective involvement of persons with disabilities and their organizations in monitoring the implementation of the Convention.

89. The Committee recommends that Macao SAR, China take into account its guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, Annex) and:

(a) Establish an independent mechanism for monitoring human rights with a broad mandate in full compliance with the Paris Principles;

(b) Ensure that persons with disabilities and the whole range of their representative organizations are effectively involved in monitoring the implementation of the Convention, including during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Indonesia (2022)

68. The Committee notes that the National Commission for Disability lacks independence as required under Law No. 8 of 2016 as it is situated under the Ministry of Social Affairs, and that the State Party has not established an independent monitoring mechanism for Convention implementation.

69. The Committee recommends that the State party provides the National Commission for Disability with structural and financial independence and designate an independent monitoring mechanism, which includes the National Commission on Human Rights of Indonesia (Komnas HAM) and effective involvement and participation of persons with disabilities through their representative organisations.

Japan (2022)

69. The Committee is concerned that:

(a) There is no national human rights institution in line with the Paris Principles at the State Party;

(b) The Commission on Policy for Persons with Disabilities, established as the monitoring mechanism of the Convention, is in Cabinet Office, has a limited scope and insufficient representation of the diversity of disabilities and gender balance among its membership.

70. The Committee recommends that the State party take into account its guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee and establish a national human rights institution with a broad mandate on the protection of human rights and adequate human, technical and financial resources, in full compliance with the Paris Principles, and, within its framework, strengthen the formal capacity of the Commission on Policy for Persons with Disabilities, and guarantee independence, the representation of diversity of disabilities and gender balance among its membership for monitoring the implementation of the Convention.

[Lao People's Democratic Republic \(2022\)](#)

62. The Committee observes with concern:

(a) The absence of an independent framework for protecting, promoting and monitoring the implementation of the Convention, and of a national human rights institution in line with Paris Principles;

(b) The potential overlap between the National Committee for Persons with Disabilities under the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, and the National Committee on Human Rights under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, concerning the implementation and monitoring of the Convention;

(c) The limited participation of all persons with disabilities, through their representative organizations, in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention.

63. The Committee recommends that the State party take into account its guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, Annex) and:

(a) Establish a national human rights institution with a broad mandate in full compliance with the Paris Principles, including its full independence and by providing it with an explicit mandate and sufficient human, technical and financial resources to promote and protect the rights of persons with disabilities;

(b) Clarify the distribution of duties on implementation, monitoring, and reporting on the Convention between the National Committee for Persons with Disabilities, and the National Committee on Human Rights;

(c) Strengthen the close consultation and active involvement of persons with disabilities through their representative organizations, including those that represent women and children, persons with intellectual and/or psychosocial disabilities and persons with disabilities in rural areas, in the implementation and monitoring processes of the Convention.

[New Zealand \(2022\)](#)

59. The Committee is concerned about:

(a) Information that the State Party is not responding to or incorporating the recommendations from reports of the Independent Monitoring Mechanism (IMM);

(b) The lack of resources, including financial support available to support the Disabled People's Organisations Coalition to fulfil its mandate as one partner of the IMM, including to engage broadly with the disability community, to participate in Convention implementation activities and fora with government agencies and other stakeholders and to effectively communicate with persons with disabilities, including translation into Māori as an official language.

60. The Committee recommends that the State party take into account its guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, Annex) and:

(a) Strengthen its accountability processes and its partnership with the IMM to track and publicly report on the outcomes and implementation of recommendations of IMM reports;

(b) Allocate adequate resources, including financial support to the Disabled People's Organisations Coalition to enable it to effectively fulfil its mandate as one partner of the IMM.

[Singapore \(2022\)](#)

61. The Committee notes with concern that the State party has not appointed an independent monitoring mechanism and does not have a national human rights institution accredited with the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI). It is equally concerned that persons with disabilities, through their representative organizations, are not sufficiently involved in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention.

62. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Establish a national human rights institution and designate an independent monitoring framework, including one or more independent mechanisms, that fulfils the Paris Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions, adopted by the General Assembly resolution 48/134 of 4 March 1994 (A/RES/48/134) and is accredited with A-status by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI);

(b) Ensure that civil society, in particular persons with disabilities and a broad range of their representative organizations, including organizations of persons with disabilities with sharply critical views of government policies on persons with disabilities, are involved and participate fully in monitoring the implementation of the Convention.

[Hungary \(2022\)](#)

64. The Committee notes with concern:

(a) The narrow scope of actions of the current coordination mechanism for implementation of the Convention, which is mainly limited to social affairs, and the lack of capacity of the Intergovernmental Disability Committee that is designated to coordinate Governmental activities and promote the provisions of the Convention across all sectors of the Government and all areas of life in the State party;

(b) The lack of independence and capacity of the National Disability Council as the designated mechanism for monitoring implementation of the Convention;

(c) The absence of effective involvement of persons with disabilities and their organizations in monitoring the implementation of the Convention.

65. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Strengthen the governmental mechanism for coordinating implementation of the Convention and build the capacity of focal points to mainstream disability rights across different sectors and levels of the administration, including in the justice system, and all areas of life, and strengthen their mandates and attributions with respect to implementing the Convention;

(b) Revise its mechanism for monitoring implementation of the Convention to guarantee its full independence, in compliance with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (Paris Principles), ensure equal participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations, including advocacy organizations, and provide the mechanism with appropriate budgetary allocations to support their participation;

(c) Ensure that organizations of persons with disabilities, including advocacy organizations, are effectively involved in the monitoring process of the implementation of the Convention, with reference to the Committee's general comment No. 7 (2018).

[Jamaica \(2022\)](#)

60. While noting the information provided by the State party delegation that the Jamaica Council for Persons with Disabilities is acting as a focal point for the national implementation of the Convention, the Committee notes with concern that the State party has not yet appointed an independent monitoring mechanism, as it does not have a national human rights institution. It is also concerned that persons with disabilities through their representative organizations are not involved in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention.

61. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Establish a national human rights institution and designate an independent monitoring framework, including one or more independent mechanisms, that, among other responsibilities, can submit alternative reports to the Committee;

(b) Ensure that persons with disabilities and the whole range of their representative organizations are effectively involved in monitoring the implementation of the Convention, including during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Mexico (2022)

68. The Committee is concerned about the undue complexity and the existence of many lacunae in the focal points and coordination mechanisms and their mutual interaction.

69. The Committee recommends that the State party comprehensively review the current system of focal points and coordination mechanisms at all levels of government, and establish a transparent system with sufficient funding, defined competences and mutual interaction.

70. With reference to paragraph 61 of its previous concluding observations, the Committee notes that despite the establishment of an independent mechanism to monitor the implementation of the Convention in Mexico, its structure, functions and activities have not been sufficiently defined with regard to the promotion, protection and monitoring of the rights enshrined in the Convention at the federal and state levels. It is further concerned about insufficient participation of persons with disabilities, in particular women with disabilities, and their representative organization in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention.

71. The Committee recommends that the State party ensure that the National Human Rights Commission and the 32 state human rights entities, as the independent monitoring mechanism for the Convention, define the mechanism's structure, goals, indicators and resources. The Committee further recommends the State party strengthen the National Commission so that it may fulfil its mandate effectively and independently, and that persons with disabilities, in particular women with disabilities, and their representative organizations are involved and participate fully in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention.

Cooperation and technical assistance

72. Under article 37 of the Convention, the Committee can provide technical guidance to the State party on any queries addressed to the experts through the secretariat. The State party can also seek technical assistance from United Nations specialized agencies with headquarters in the country or the region.

Switzerland (2022)

63. The Committee notes with concern:

(a) That the current coordination mechanism within the Government lacks the capacity to mainstream the Convention into all sectors and levels of government, particularly at the cantonal level, and that only four cantons have disability focal points;

(b) The limited scope of the planned national human rights institution;

(c) The lack of information about formal mechanisms to ensure the participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in monitoring of implementation of the Convention.

64. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Strengthen the government mechanism for coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the Convention at the federal and cantonal levels, designate disability focal points in all cantons to implement the Convention, and build the capacity to mainstream the rights of persons with disabilities into all sectors and levels of government;

(b) Ensure that the national human rights institution is independent and has a broad mandate on the protection of human rights and adequate human, technical and financial

resources, in conformity with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles);
(c) Ensure that persons with disabilities, including children with disabilities, through their representative organizations, are effectively involved and participate fully in monitoring of implementation of the Convention.

Venezuela (2022)

58. The Committee notes with concern that:

(a) Despite it having been reported in 2017 that, pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding signed in September 2019 with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, there were plans to create a national mechanism for follow-up to international human rights recommendations, no such mechanism has been established;

(b) The State party has not established an independent monitoring mechanism for following up on and assessing the application and implementation of the Convention.

59. The Committee recommends that the State party establish an independent mechanism to monitor and assess international human rights recommendations and legally designate government focal points to mainstream disability rights in the implementation of the Convention, providing them with an adequate budget and sufficient resources; and include the Ombudsman's Office in the independent monitoring mechanism, in line with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles), with the effective and independent participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations.

Djibouti (2021)

59. The Committee notes with concern:

(a) The lack of independence of the National Human Rights Commission and its lack of sufficient resources to promote and protect the rights of persons with disabilities under the Convention;

(b) The insufficient human, technical and financial resources allocated to the National Agency for Persons with Disabilities, which prevents it from fulfilling its mandate effectively as a coordination mechanism to facilitate actions across all sectors and levels of government;

(c) The limited participation of all persons with disabilities, especially women with disabilities, through their representative organizations, in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention.

60. Recalling general comment No. 7 and the guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex), the Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Adopt legal measures to ensure that the National Human Rights Commission fully complies with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles), including by ensuring its full independence and by providing it with sufficient human, technical and financial resources to promote and protect the rights of persons with disabilities, and apply to the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) for accreditation;

(b) Strengthen the capacity of the National Agency for Persons with Disabilities, including by allocating sufficient human, technical and financial resources so that it can fulfil its mandate effectively;

(c) Take the measures necessary to strengthen consultation with and the effective and meaningful participation of persons with disabilities through their representative organizations, including those that represent women and children, persons with intellectual

or psychosocial disabilities and persons with disabilities in rural areas and in refugee camps, in the implementation and monitoring processes.

France (2021)

66. The Committee notes with concern:

- (a) The lack of systematic capacity building programmes among public officials concerning the implementation of the Convention, including in the Overseas territorial collectivities;
- (b) The lack of information about participation of persons with disabilities in the composition of the independent monitoring mechanisms, and about mechanisms to foster involvement of representative organisations of persons with disabilities in the independent monitoring mechanism responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Convention.

67. The Committee recommends that the State party:

- (a) Strengthen the capacity of disability focal points in all areas of the Convention, notably the Secretary General of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Disabilities and senior official in charge of disability and inclusion within each ministry, and in the Overseas territorial collectivities, aimed at ensuring they rely on the provisions of the Convention for all matters relating to persons with disabilities;**
- (b) Strengthen the human, technical and financial resources allocated to the Defender of Rights to accomplish its mandate concerning monitoring of the Convention;**
- (c) Take measures to increase diversity and participation and appoint persons with disabilities, including women with disabilities as members of the independent monitoring mechanisms;**
- (d) Ensure that persons with disabilities and the diversity of their representative organizations are effectively involved in monitoring the implementation of the Convention.**

Estonia (2021)

64. The Committee notes with concern:

- (a) That the current coordination mechanism within the government lacks the capacity to mainstream the Convention across all sectors and levels of government, not only the area of social affairs;
- (b) The lack of information about the accessibility of the premises and about the work done by the Office of the Chancellor of Justice as the independent mechanism appointed to monitor the implementation of the Convention;
- (c) The lack of information about formal mechanisms to ensure the participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in monitoring the Convention, including by monitoring the situation of persons with disabilities still in institutions and during the COVID-19 pandemic.

65. The Committee recommends that the State party:

- (a) Strengthen the government mechanism for coordinating the implementation of the Convention, build the capacity of focal points to mainstream the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and levels of government and strengthen their mandates with respect to implementing the Convention;**
- (b) Ensure continuity in the allocation of funds for the functioning of the Office of the Chancellor of Justice, which has been appointed the independent mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the Convention, including by earmarking resources for the development of accessible information about its work and methodologies;**
- (c) Ensure that persons with disabilities and the whole range of their representative organizations are effectively involved in monitoring the implementation of the Convention, including during the COVID-19 pandemic.**

Albania (2019)

53. The Committee is concerned about the lack of information about efforts to consider identifying a coordination mechanism, as outlined in article 33 (1) of the Convention. The Committee is concerned that the mechanism designated by the State party under article 33 (2) is not in line with the Convention. It is also concerned about the unequal representation of organizations of persons with disabilities in the monitoring process.

54. Taking into account its guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex) and its General Comment no. 7 (2018) on the participation of persons with disabilities in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention, the Committee recommends that the State party ensure that its national implementation and monitoring framework has a stable institutional basis that allows it to operate properly over time and that it is appropriately funded and resourced. It also recommends that the State party:

- (a) Consider the appointment of a coordination mechanism under article 33 (1) of the Convention;**
- (b) Ensure that when designating or establishing an independent monitoring framework and mechanisms, it into account the Principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (Paris Principles), that it provide adequate funding for its functioning;**
- (c) Ensure the full participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the monitoring process.**

Australia (2019)

61. The Committee is concerned about:

- (a) The lack of sufficient resources allocated to effectively implement the National Disability Strategy;
- (b) The existing legal framework limiting the scope and power of the Australian Human Rights Commission to perform the task of effectively and independently monitoring the implementation of the Convention;
- (c) The lack of an effective monitoring mechanism under the National Disability Strategy, which is an overarching policy framework;
- (d) The lack of a formal mechanism and sustainable funding for the full and effective participation of persons with disabilities, through their representative organizations, in all aspects of the implementation and monitoring of the Convention.

62. The Committee reiterates its previous recommendation on national implementation and monitoring (CRPD/C/AUS/CO/1, para. 58) and recommends that the State party:

- (a) Ensure that sufficient resources are available for the effective implementation of the National Disability Strategy;**
- (b) Revise existing laws or enact new laws, including a national comprehensive human rights law, to expand and strengthen the scope and power of the Australian Human Rights Commission to perform the task of independently monitoring the implementation of the Convention, in line with article 33 (2) of the Convention and the Committee's general comment No. 7;**
- (c) Establish a formal monitoring mechanism under the National Disability Strategy that includes the Office of Disability Strategy, as recommended by the Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs in 2017, ensuring effective coordination between the federal and state levels;**
- (d) Establish a formal mechanism and ensure sustainable and adequate funding for the meaningful engagement of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention.**

Ecuador (2019)

59. The Committee notes with concern that the State party has not designated an independent monitoring mechanism for the follow-up and evaluation of the implementation of the Convention with a budget and designated functions that involves the effective and independent participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations.

60. The Committee recommends that the State party take urgent action, bearing in mind the guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex), to establish an independent mechanism with a budget and designated functions for monitoring the implementation of the Convention. The Committee recommends that the Ombudsman's Office be involved in the independent monitoring mechanism, in line with the Paris Principles, and that persons with disabilities and their representative organizations participate in it effectively and independently.

El Salvador (2019)

62. The Committee is concerned that the Office for the Defence of Human Rights, designated as the entity to evaluate the implementation of the Convention, lacks the independence, in practice, and the resources and mechanisms, for the systematic involvement of persons with disabilities and their organizations that would allow it to adequately carry out its functions.

63. Taking into account the Committee's 2016 guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex), the Committee recommends that the State party allocate specific resources, including budget and personnel, for the Office to carry out monitoring of the implementation of the Convention and ensure the involvement both of persons with disabilities and of their organizations so as to guarantee compliance with article 33 of the Convention.

Greece (2019)

48. The Committee is concerned about:

(a) The lack of information on the effective operation of the national implementation and monitoring framework established under article 33 of the Convention;

(b) The insufficient level of involvement of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the monitoring process;

(c) The absence of transparent and adequate financial support for organizations of persons with disabilities, including the lack of support for their participation ahead of the State party's review, such as submitting alternative reports.

49. In line with the Convention and the guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex), the Committee recommends that the State party strengthen its national monitoring and implementation framework, ensure its effective operation and interoperability between the competent structures involved, on the basis of transparent procedures and with the full participation of organizations of persons with disabilities. It encourages the State party to appoint the Greek National Commission for Human Rights as part of the independent monitoring framework under article 33 of the Convention. In light of its general comment No. 7 (2018) on the participation of persons with disabilities, including children with disabilities, through their representative organizations, in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention, the Committee also recommends that the State party ensure the provision of appropriate resources for organizations of persons with disabilities, including support through independent and self-managed funding, to take part in the independent monitoring frameworks tasked with monitoring the implementation of the Convention.

India (2019)

68. The Committee is concerned about:

- (a) The lack of executive power of the Central Advisory Board on Disability and the equivalent state bodies for coordination across different departments and sectors to ensure the effective implementation of the Convention;
- (b) The absence of an independent framework for protecting, promoting and monitoring the implementation of the Convention, despite the appointment of the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities and the state commissioners for persons with disabilities;
- (c) The lack of information about mechanisms for the participation of organizations of persons with disabilities in the independent monitoring of the Convention.

69. The Committee recommends that the State party:

- (a) Take measures to strengthen the Central Advisory Board and the equivalent state bodies beyond an advisory role and ensure the coordination of focal points on disability, at all levels in the State party and in all sectors, for the effective implementation of the Convention;**
- (b) Ensure that the national and state human rights commissions are part of the independent monitoring framework under article 33 (2) of the Convention, providing technical, human and financial support to accomplish their mandates. The State party should take account of the Committee's guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex) when designing the independent monitoring framework;**
- (c) Ensure that persons with disabilities, through their representative organizations, effectively participate in monitoring of the implementation of the Convention.**

Iraq (2019)

63. The Committee is concerned that:

- (a) There is insufficient information about the representation of persons with disabilities in the Commission on the Care of Persons with Disabilities and Special Needs, which was set up under article 4 of Law No. 38 (2013) and is intended to fulfil the functions of an independent national coordination mechanism in line with article 33 (1) of the Convention;
- (b) The High Commission for Human Rights does not fully comply with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights (the Paris Principles);
- (c) That there is a lack of information on specific mechanisms for the participation of representative organizations of persons with disabilities in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention.

64. Recalling its general comment No. 7 (2018) on the participation of persons with disabilities, including children with disabilities, through their representative organizations, in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention, the Committee recommends that the State party:

- (a) Ensure the representation of persons with disabilities, in particular women with disabilities and persons with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities, in the Commission on the Care of Persons with Disabilities and Special Needs and its board of directors;**
- (b) Take all measures necessary to ensure that the High Commission for Human Rights can effectively and independently discharge its mandate as an independent mechanism tasked with monitoring the implementation of the Convention, in line with its article 33 (2) and in accordance with the Paris Principles and taking into account the guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex);**
- (c) Facilitate the effective and meaningful participation of representative organizations of persons with disabilities in the entire process of monitoring the implementation of the**

Convention, in accordance with the provisions of article 33 (2) of the Convention, including by providing adequate funding.

Kuwait (2019)

64. The Committee is concerned about the absence of an independent mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the Convention.

65. The Committee recommends that the State party designate an independent monitoring mechanism that is in full compliance with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights (the Paris Principles), that is independent from the executive branch, in particular the Council of Ministers, and that has sufficient and appropriate resources for its operation. The Committee also recommends that the State party ensure that monitoring activities are carried out in close consultation with and with the active participation of organizations of persons with disabilities.

Myanmar (2019)

63. The Committee is concerned about:

(a) The limited independence of the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission and its lack of an explicit mandate and sufficient resources to promote and protect the rights of persons with disabilities under the Convention;

(b) The insufficient human, technical and financial resources allocated to the National Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which prevents it from fulfilling its mandate effectively;

(c) The limited participation of all persons with disabilities, through their representative organizations, in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention.

64. Recalling general comment No. 7 (2018) on the participation of persons with disabilities, including children with disabilities, through their representative organizations, in the implementation and monitoring of the Convention, and the guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, Annex) , the Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Ensure that the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission fully complies with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles) , including by ensuring its full independence and by providing it with an explicit mandate and sufficient human, technical and financial resources to promote and protect the rights of persons with disabilities;

(b) Strengthen the capacity of the National Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, including by allocating sufficient human, technical and financial resources so that it can fulfil its mandate effectively;

(c) Take the measures necessary to strengthen consultation with and the effective and meaningful participation of persons with disabilities through their representative organizations, including those that represent women and children, persons with intellectual or psychosocial disabilities and persons with disabilities in rural areas, in the implementation and monitoring processes.

Cuba (2019)

55. The Committee is concerned about the lack of an independent mechanism to monitor implementation of the Convention in the State party in compliance with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (Paris Principles).

56. The Committee recommends that the State party establish an independent mechanism for monitoring the Convention, in accordance with article 33 of the Convention and the Paris Principles, and that it allocate the human, technical and financial resources in

sufficient quality and quantity for the mechanism to carry out its functions, involving organizations of persons with disabilities in the pursuit of its mandate.

[Niger \(2019\)](#)

55. The Committee is concerned about:

- (a) The limited effectiveness of the Monitoring Committee to monitor the implementation of the Convention and the lack of focal points with sufficient mandate and financial resources to implement the Convention;
- (b) The lack of an independent mechanism that takes into account the Paris Principles to monitor the implementation of the Convention with sufficient budgetary allocation;
- (c) The lack of participation of persons with disabilities, through their representative organisations, in the monitoring process of the Convention.

56. The Committee recommends that the State Party designate focal points, establish an independent mechanism taking into account the Paris Principles with sufficient budgetary allocation to monitor the implementation of the Convention; and ensure participation of persons with disabilities, through their representative organisations in the monitoring process.

[Rwanda \(2019\)](#)

61. The Committee notes with concern that the National Commission for Human Rights does not have sufficient human, technical and financial resources, which prevents it from effectively performing its mandate. The Committee is also concerned about the limited participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the national implementation and monitoring process as a whole.

62. Taking into account its guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex), the Committee recommends that the State party allocate human, technical and financial resources in sufficient quality and quantity to the National Commission for Human Rights to enable it to effectively perform its mandate. The Committee also recommends that the State party ensure the full participation of persons with disabilities, especially women with disabilities, and their representative organizations, in the monitoring of the implementation of the Convention, including by providing the necessary funding.

[Saudi Arabia \(2019\)](#)

57. The Committee is concerned that the State party's National Human Rights Commission does not function in line with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights.

58. Taking into account the Committee's guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex), the Committee recommends that the State party review the Charter regulating the functioning of the National Human Rights Commission to bring it in line with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles).

[Senegal \(2019\)](#)

57. The Committee is concerned about:

- (a) The limited effectiveness of the focal points within government relating to the implementation of the Convention;
- (b) The lack of clarity on the designation of the entities that compose the independent mechanism for the monitoring and implementation of the Convention in line with Article 33 (2) of the Convention;

(c) The lack of measures for the meaningful consultation and effective participation of representative organisations of persons with disabilities in adopting policies and other matters affecting them.

58. The Committee recommends that the State Party:

(a) Strengthen and build the capacity of focal points within government to implement the Convention;

(b) Take into account the guidelines of the Committee on independent monitoring frameworks and guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex) and the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles), and designate an adequate framework to monitor and implement the Convention;

(c) Adopt necessary measures and strengthen meaningful and effective consultation and participation of persons with disabilities and through organisations of persons with disabilities, including those that represent women and children and older persons with disabilities, persons with psychosocial or intellectual disabilities and persons with disabilities in rural areas, when adopting policies, and on other matters that concern them.

[Spain \(2019\)](#)

62. The Committee is concerned about the lack of support, including financial support, for ensuring the independent monitoring of the implementation of the Convention.

63. Taking into account its guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex), the Committee recommends that the State party strengthen the capacity of the Committee of Representatives of Persons with Disabilities (CERMI) and its role of independent monitoring mechanism for the implementation of the Convention, and provide CERMI with adequate resources and funding for its functioning.

[Türkiye \(2019\)](#)

64. The Committee observes with concern:

(a) The absence of information on guidelines for disability inclusion throughout the State party's technical cooperation and assistance programmes;

(b) The lack of information about access by civil society organizations, including organizations of persons with disabilities, to international funding for implementing the rights of persons with disabilities;

(c) The lack of information about measures to adhere to the Convention in efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

65. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Adopt policy frameworks and guidelines on international cooperation, recognizing disability as an integral part in international development policies, and allocate adequate resources;

(b) Ensure that organizations of persons with disabilities can receive or seek funding and other resources from national and international sources;

(c) Actively involve and closely consult with persons with disabilities, through their representative organizations, on public budgeting processes, the monitoring of the Sustainable Development Goals at the national level, international decision-making and international cooperation.

[Vanuatu \(2019\)](#)

56. The Committee is concerned that no independent monitoring mechanism has yet been established, as required under article 33 (2) of the Convention and that persons with disabilities through their organisations are not fully and meaningfully involved in the

monitoring process. It is also concerned that provincial disability committees that monitor implementation of national strategies and framework of the Convention as focal points at the provincial level, have not been established in Penama, Sanma, Torba.

57. The Committee recommends that the State party:

- (a) Designate or establish an independent monitoring mechanism in conformity with the Paris Principles and the Committee's guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (see CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex);**
- (b) Ensure the full participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the process of monitoring the implementation of the Convention;**
- (c) Establish provincial disability committees in all provinces, without delay, to strengthen implementation and monitoring of national strategies and action plans of the Convention.**

Algeria (2018)

56. The Committee is concerned that:

- (a) Contrary to Prime Ministerial Instruction No. 368 of 21 December 2013, on the mainstreaming of disability in sectoral programmes, focal points for disability issues have not been appointed in all ministries;
- (b) The centrally appointed focal point, the Ministry of National Solidarity, the Family and the Status of Women, lacks the capacity to effectively carry out its role;
- (c) The National Council for Human Rights does not fully comply with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights (the Paris Principles);
- (d) Pending the revision of the National Council for Persons with Disabilities, there are no specific mechanisms for the participation of representative organizations of persons with disabilities in the monitoring of the Convention.

57. The Committee, recalling the guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, Annex), recommends that the State party:

- (a) Expedite the implementation of Prime Ministerial Instruction No. 368, of 21 December 2013, and designate focal points in all ministries to mainstream disability issues across all policies and programmes;**
- (b) Take all necessary measures to ensure that the National Council for Human Rights can effectively and independently discharge its mandate in full compliance with the Paris Principles;**
- (c) Facilitate the effective and meaningful participation of representative organizations of persons with disabilities in the entire process of monitoring the implementation of the Convention, including in a revised National Council for Persons with Disabilities, consistent with the Convention;**
- (d) Ensure that the monitoring frameworks are independent from advisory bodies or the focal points appointed under article 33 (1) of the Convention.**

Bulgaria

71. The Committee notes with concern that the State party has not yet designated an independent monitoring mechanism in line with provisions of article 33 (2) and 33 (3) of the Convention.

72. Taking into account the Guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and the participation in the work of the Committee (2016), the Committee recommends that the State party designates an independent monitoring mechanism that fully complies with the Paris Principles, such as Office of Ombudsman and the Commission for the Protection against Discrimination. It furthermore calls upon the State party to ensure participation of persons with disabilities in such independent monitoring mechanism, in line with provisions of article 33 (2) of the Convention, including by providing adequate funding for their full and effective participation in the monitoring process.

Malta (2018)

49. The Committee is concerned about the lack of independence and transparency of the Commission for the Rights of Persons with Disability designated under article 33.2 of the Convention, in as much as the appointment of its members under the Equal Opportunities (Persons with Disability) Act (Cap. 413) is undertaken by the executive branch.

50. Taking into account its guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex), the Committee recommends that the State party repeal and/or amend articles 21A(1) and 24(1) of the Equal Opportunities (Persons with Disability) Act (Cap. 413) to ensure sufficient representation and engagement of representative organizations of persons with disabilities, accountability and transparency. It further calls on the State party to review the draft of the Human Rights And Equality Commission Bill to ensure that the planned Maltese National Human Rights Institute adheres to the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles).

Philippines (2018)

60. The Committee is concerned about:

(a) The lack of information about a coordination mechanism, and the designation of focal points across all branches of government on disability matters, which collaborate with the National Council for Disability Affairs on implementing the Convention;

(b) The lack of specific mechanisms within the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines to engage and ensure participation of persons with disabilities, through their representative organizations in monitoring the Convention at the national and local levels.

61. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Strengthen the competencies and resources of the National Council for Disability Affairs concerning the implementation of the Convention, and ensure that all branches and levels of government designate disability focal points with budget allocations to carry out programmes under the Convention;

(b) Ensure that public authorities implementing the Convention ensure the respect of the human rights model of disability, avoid labelling of children with disabilities and ensure the protection of their rights under the Convention;

(c) Ensure the appointment of an independent monitoring framework in line with the Paris Principles and sufficient funding to the Commission on Human Rights for the Philippines to undertake its mandate to monitor the Convention, and to enable organizations of persons with disabilities to participate throughout the monitoring and implementation of the Convention, in line with article 33 (3) of the Convention, and taking into account the guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (see CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex).

Poland (2018)

52. The Committee is concerned about the lack of:

(a) Capacity of the focal points that focuses predominantly on the social protection issues currently designated for matters relating to the implementation of the Convention and its coordination within Government;

(b) Legal basis and decrease in funding for the Human Rights Defender, designated as independent authority to promote, protect and monitor the implementation of the provisions of the Convention;

(c) Meaningful involvement of representative organizations of persons with disabilities in the monitoring on the implementation of the Convention.

53. The Committee recommends that the State party:

- (a) Designate a cross-sectorial authority to coordinate and lead the mainstreaming and implementation of the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors at all levels in all areas of life;**
- (b) Strengthen the capacity of the Commissioner for Human Rights as independent authority to promote, protect and monitor the implementation of the Convention, in providing it with adequate legal bases and allocating it sufficient resources and funding to be able to effectively and independently discharge its mandate;**
- (c) Ensure the comprehensive and effective involvement of organizations of persons with disabilities in the monitoring tasks under the Convention and provide them with the funding necessary for this purpose.**

South Africa (2018)

54. The Committee is concerned about:

- (a) The lack of information about the specific focal points and mechanisms at the regional and local levels to implement the Convention;
- (b) The absence of an independent monitoring entity to exercise the powers of an independent mechanism for the protection, promotion and monitoring of the Convention in accordance with the provisions of article 33, paragraph 2, of the Convention and in line with the Paris Principles;
- (c) The lack of processes for the meaningful consultation of organisations of persons with disabilities in adopting policies and other matters affecting them, and that their views are often not adequately reflected in the decisions adopted;
- (d) The lack of provision of the necessary resources by the Department of Social Development to promote the effective participation of organisations of persons with disabilities and the cumbersome and expensive accreditation procedures, especially in rural and remote areas.

55. The Committee recommends that the State Party:

- (a) Establish a mechanism and a system of focal points, including adopting measures to strengthen the efficiency of the focal points at the national, regional and local levels to implement the Convention;**
- (b) Expedite the designation of the South African Human Rights Commission as the Independent Monitoring Mechanism and allocate sufficient financial resources to enable it fully execute its mandate;**
- (c) Establish and strengthen mechanisms for meaningful and effective consultation and participation of organisations of persons with disabilities, including those that represent women and children and older persons with disabilities, persons with psychosocial and/or intellectual disabilities and persons with disabilities in rural areas, when adopting policies, and on other matters that concern them, and ensure that accreditation procedures are accessible and simplified at all levels of the National Disability Rights Machinery.**

North Macedonia (2018)

60. The Committee is concerned about the lack of resources available for the effective and comprehensive monitoring conducted by the independent monitoring framework established in accordance with article 33 (2) of the Convention, which limits the support provided to organizations of persons with disabilities to participate in the monitoring process.

61. The Committee recommends that the State party provide sufficient funding for monitoring frameworks and organizations of persons with disabilities to enable them to monitor the implementation of the Convention across the State party, taking into account the guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex).

Haiti (2018)

60. The Committee is concerned by the insufficient clarity and scope of the mandates of the Office of the Protection of Citizens. It regrets that no independent monitoring mechanism as required under article 33 (2) has been designated yet. It is further concerned about the absence of mechanisms to ensure the participation of persons with disabilities, through their representative organizations in monitoring processes.

61. Recalling its guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex), the Committee recommends that the State party:

- (a) Take the measures necessary to designate focal points in all areas of Government to integrate disability in all programmes and policies;**
- (b) Expedite the designation of an independent mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the Convention, and ensure its independence;**
- (c) Ensure the full participation of persons with disabilities and organizations of civil society in the process of monitoring the implementation of the Convention.**

Nepal (2018)

49. The Committee is concerned about the lack of resources and the lack of effective and comprehensive inclusion of organizations of persons with disabilities in order to facilitate their participation in the monitoring processes regarding the implementation of the Convention in accordance with article 33 (3).

50. The Committee recommends that the State party provide adequate funding for both established monitoring frameworks and organizations of persons with disabilities to enable them to monitor the implementation of the Convention across the State party, in accordance with article 33 (3) and taking into account the guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex).

Oman (2018)

59. The Committee is concerned about the lack of a comprehensive national action plan on disability and the lack of information regarding measures taken by the National Monitoring Committee to Promote Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities with respect to implementation of the Convention by the relevant government departments. The Committee is also concerned that the National Human Rights Commission, which is responsible for monitoring the protection of human rights in the State party, is accredited with B status, essentially due to its limited independence and lack of a clear mandate, as well as the low number of complaints received by the Commission.

60. The Committee recommends that the State party:

- (a) Establish and implement as a matter of priority a comprehensive policy on persons with disabilities that encompasses all areas covered by the Convention and develop a strategy with the elements for its application, which is supported by sufficient human, technical and financial resources;**
- (b) Ensure that the National Monitoring Committee is provided with a clear mandate and sufficient authority to coordinate all activities related to the implementation of the Convention at cross-sectoral, national, regional and local levels, and is provided with the necessary human, technical and financial resources for its effective operation;**
- (c) Take immediate steps to bring the National Human Rights Commission into full compliance with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (Paris Principles), allocate sufficient resources for its operation and ensure the participation of persons with disabilities, as well as raise**

awareness about the Commission, including its complaint mechanism, in the society at large, in particular among persons with disabilities.

[Russian Federation \(2018\)](#)

66. The Committee is concerned about the lack of an explicitly identified coordination mechanism as outlined in article 33 (1). It also notes with concern insufficient involvement of representative organizations of persons with disabilities in monitoring the implementation of the Convention. It further notes insufficient and ineffective monitoring at the level of regions of the State party.

67. Taking into account the Guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and the participation in the work of the Committee (2016), the Committee recommends that the State party:

- (a) Appoint focal point(s) to improve harmonized implementation of the Convention in the State party with special regard to competencies at the regional level;**
- (b) Ensure the full and effective participation of persons with disabilities, through the representative organizations in the monitoring process, including by providing the necessary funding.**

[Seychelles \(2018\)](#)

57. The Committee is concerned that:

- (a) The State party has not yet designated the focal point and/or a coordinating mechanism for the implementation of the Convention and that the role of the National Council for Disabled Persons is mostly relegated to advocacy;
- (b) The National Human Rights Commission set up in 2012 and the Office of the Ombudsman do not comply with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles);
- (c) The independent monitoring mechanism has not been designated or established;
- (d) Persons with disabilities, through their representative organizations, are not fully involved in processes relating to monitoring the implementation of the Convention.

58. The Committee recommends that the State party:

- (a) Designate one or more focal points for the implementation of legislation and policies which are in conformity with the provisions of the Convention;**
- (b) Adopt measures, including providing sufficient resources, to ensure that the mandate of the National Human Rights Commission is separate from, but complements, that of the Office of the Ombudsman and that the national human rights institution complies with the Paris Principles;**
- (c) Designate an independent monitoring mechanism in conformity with the Paris Principles and the Committee ' s guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (see CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex);**
- (d) Ensure that persons with disabilities and their representative organizations participate fully in the framework monitoring the implementation of the Convention, as required by article 33 (3).**

[Slovenia \(2018\)](#)

57. The Committee is concerned about:

- (a) The lack of capacity of the appointed focal point, namely the Ministry of Labour, for the coordination of the implementation of the Convention across different sectors and at different levels;
- (b) The lack of independence, capacity and resources of the Council of Slovenia for Persons with Disabilities designated as the independent monitoring framework of the implementation of the Convention;

(c) The lack of meaningful involvement of representative organisations of persons with disabilities in monitoring the implementation of the Convention.

58. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Reinforce the role and capacity of the appointed focal points for the coordination of the implementation of the Convention across different sectors and at different levels;

(b) Set up an independent monitoring mechanism that adheres to the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles) and provide it with adequate funding, bearing in mind the Guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, see Annex);

(c) Ensure the full involvement of the organizations of persons with disabilities in the monitoring tasks under the Convention and provide it with the funding necessary for this purpose.

[Sudan \(2018\)](#)

67. The Committee is concerned about the lack of resources available for the effective comprehensive monitoring conducted by the independent monitoring framework established in accordance with article 33 (2) of the Convention, which limits the support provided to organizations of persons with disabilities to participate in the monitoring process.

68. The Committee recommends that the State party provide sufficient funding for monitoring frameworks and organizations of persons with disabilities to enable them to monitor the implementation of the Convention across the State party, taking into account the guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex).

[Latvia \(2017\)](#)

54. The Committee notes with concern the limited capacity of the mechanisms to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the Convention, namely the Ministry of Welfare and Office of the Ombudsman, respectively, including the lack of systemized participation of representative organizations of persons with disabilities in these mechanisms.

55. The Committee recommends that the State party considerably strengthen the role and capacities of both the Ministry of Welfare and the Office of the Ombudsman as the focal points designated, respectively, as coordinating and monitoring mechanisms for the implementation of the Convention, while ensuring the provision of adequate funding and the full participation of representative organizations of persons with disabilities in the coordination and monitoring processes.

[Luxembourg \(2017\)](#)

58. The Committee is concerned by the insufficient clarity and scope of the mandates, resources and authority of the entities designated under article 33 (2), and that discrimination occurring in the private sector is not covered. It is further concerned about the absence of mechanisms to ensure the participation of persons with disabilities, through their representative organizations, in monitoring processes.

59. Taking into account its draft guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee, the Committee recommends that the State party take the measures necessary to ensure that the independent monitoring mechanism complies fully with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (Paris Principles), i.e., that it includes no government representatives, that it has an adequate budget for its functioning and that it operates in close consultation with organizations of persons with disabilities. It also

recommends that the independent monitoring mechanism has the mandate to cover cases of discrimination in the public and private sectors to extend its protection.

Montenegro (2017)

60. The Committee is concerned about the lack of an explicitly identified coordination mechanism, as outlined in article 33 (1) of the Convention. It notes with concern that the Ombudsman is not carrying out the duties of an independent mechanism, as outlined in article 33 (2).

61. Taking into account the Committee's 2016 guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee, it recommends that the State party:

- (a) Appoint a governmental body to be the focal point for the implementation of the Convention, and consider the appointment of a coordination mechanism under article 33 (1) of the Convention;**
- (b) Establish a national independent mechanism to monitor the implementation of the Convention and ensure its compliance with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles);**
- (c) Ensure the full participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the monitoring process, including by providing the necessary funding.**

Morocco (2017)

62. The Committee is concerned about:

- (a) The lack of information about the specific role of the interministerial commission responsible for implementing the Convention, including with respect to the relevant specific mechanisms and focal points at the regional and local levels;
- (b) The delay in the parliament regarding the process to adopt the draft bill on the National Human Rights Council, which recognizes the competence of the Council to exercise the powers of an independent mechanism for the protection, promotion and monitoring of the Convention.

63. The Committee recommends that the State party:

- (a) Specify the roles of the interministerial commission responsible for supporting the implementation of the Convention and those of the relevant focal points and, in particular, adopt measures to strengthen the efficiency of the commission and the focal points;**
- (b) Establish a mechanism and a system of focal points at the regional and local levels to implement the Convention;**
- (c) Expedite in the parliament the adoption of the draft bill on the National Human Rights Council, which recognizes the competence of the Council to exercise the powers of an independent mechanism for the protection, promotion and monitoring of the Convention, in accordance with the provisions in article 33 of the Convention, and allocate to the Council sufficient budgetary allocation and human resources;**
- (d) Ensure permanent participation of persons with disabilities, through their representative organizations, in the monitoring process of the Convention, including by providing necessary funding.**

Panama (2017)

64. The Committee is concerned that there is no independent mechanism to monitor implementation of the Convention in the State party.

65. The Committee recommends that the State party designate an independent mechanism for monitoring the Convention, in accordance with article 33 of the Convention and the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (Paris Principles), and that it allocate material and human resources in

sufficient quality and quantity for the mechanism to carry out its functions, involving organizations of persons with disabilities in the pursuit of its mandate.

[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland \(2017\)](#)

68. The Committee notes with concern the lack of comprehensive mechanisms and sufficient resources, which limit the Office for Disability Issues in its mandate to coordinate the implementation of the Convention across the State party, as provided in article 33 (1) of the Convention.

69. The Committee recommends that the State party set up an appropriate coordinating structure of focal points with sufficient funding to strengthen the implementation of the Convention under all devolved governments and territories under its jurisdiction and/or control.

70. The Committee is concerned about the lack of resources available for the effective and comprehensive monitoring conducted by the independent monitoring framework established in accordance with article 33 (2) of the Convention, which limits the support provided to organizations of persons with disabilities to participate in the monitoring process.

71. The Committee recommends that the State party ensure in all its entities the independence of, and provide sufficient funding for, both established monitoring frameworks and organizations of persons with disabilities to enable them to monitor the implementation of the Convention across the State party, taking into account the guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (see CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex).

[Armenia \(2017\)](#)

57. The Committee is concerned about the lack of resources allocated to the national monitoring mechanism and the insufficient participation of organizations of persons with disabilities in the monitoring process.

58. Taking into account its guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex) and the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles), the Committee recommends that the State party provide adequate funding for the functioning of the independent monitoring mechanism and ensure the full participation of organizations of persons with disabilities in the monitoring process.

[Bosnia and Herzegovina \(2017\)](#)

58. The Committee is concerned that there is no explicitly identified coordination mechanism as outlined in article 33 (1) of the Convention. In addition, the national human rights institution does not act as an independent mechanism as outlined in article 33 (2).

59. Taking into account the guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee, of 2016, the Committee recommends that the State party nominate focal points on the implementation of the Convention at all levels of government and set up an independent monitoring framework tasked with monitoring the implementation of the Convention.

[Canada \(2017\)](#)

57. The Committee is concerned that the State party has not designated an independent mechanism to monitor the implementation of the Convention as required under article 33 (2). It is further concerned about the absence of mechanisms to ensure the participation of

persons with disabilities, through their representative organizations, in monitoring processes.

58. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Set up an independent monitoring mechanism that adheres to the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles). It strongly encourages the State party to formally appoint the Canadian Human Rights Commission as the independent monitoring mechanism under article 33 of the Convention, bearing in mind the guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD/C/1/Rev.1, annex);

(b) Provide adequate funding for the functioning of an independent monitoring mechanism and the full involvement of organizations of persons with disabilities in its monitoring tasks under the Convention.

Cyprus (2017)

65. The Committee is concerned that the monitoring mechanism is insufficiently resourced to perform its duties.

66. The Committee recommends that the State party allocate urgently additional funding to the mechanism in order to strengthen monitoring of the implementation of the Convention.

Honduras (2017)

69. Preocupa al Comité que la Dirección General de Desarrollo para las Personas con Discapacidad no constituye un mecanismo de supervisión independiente, conforme a los principios relativos al estatuto de las instituciones nacionales de promoción y protección de los derechos humanos (Principios de París). Le preocupa además la insuficiencia en los recursos de dicha Comisión y su insuficiente rango jerárquico para llevar a cabo su mandato.

70. El Comité recomienda al Estado parte que adopte medidas para asegurar que el mecanismo que designe para promover, proteger y supervisar la aplicación de la Convención se ajuste plenamente a los Principios de París, y que sea un órgano independiente, con el rango jerárquico y los recursos suficientes para desempeñar sus funciones y que garantice la plena participación de las personas con discapacidad y de sus organizaciones representativas en dicho mecanismo.

Iran (Islamic Republic of) (2017)

62. The Committee is concerned about the lack of effectiveness of existing coordination mechanism among public offices in all sectors, and national, provincial and municipal levels, concerning the implementation of the Convention. It is also concerned about the absence of an independent monitoring mechanism to monitor the implementation of the Convention and the lack of participation of civil society in the monitoring process.

63. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Appoint a governmental body to be the focal point for the implementation of the Convention, and consider the establishment of a coordination mechanism under article 33 (1); and

(b) Establish a national mechanism to monitor the implementation of the Convention, with the participation of an institution in compliance with the Paris Principles, in line with article 33 (2) of the Convention, and ensure full participation of persons with disabilities through their representative organizations in the monitoring process in line with article 33 (3) of the Convention.

Jordan (2017)

63. The Committee notes with concern the lack of an independent national coordination mechanism in line with article 33 (2) of the Convention.

64. The Committee recommends that the State party designate an independent mechanism to monitor the implementation of the Convention, in line with article 33 (2) thereof and in accordance with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (Paris Principles), allocate sufficient resources for its operation and ensure the participation of persons with disabilities.

Republic of Moldova (2017)

58. The Committee is concerned that the mechanism designated by the State party under article 33 (2) is not in line with the Convention. It also has concerns about the unequal representation in the monitoring process of organizations of persons with disabilities in the monitoring process.

59. Taking into account its guidelines on independent monitoring frameworks and their participation in the work of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2016), the Committee recommends that the State party designate an independent monitoring mechanism in accordance with the Principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (Paris Principles), that it provide adequate funding for its functioning and that organizations of persons with disabilities fully participate in the monitoring process.

Bolivia (2016)

73. The Committee is concerned that the budget allocated to the Ombudsman's Office, as the body responsible for the independent monitoring of the implementation of the Convention, is unpredictable and insufficient.

74. The Committee urges the State party to allocate sufficient resources for the Ombudsman's Office to effectively carry out its mandate in terms of monitoring of the Convention, and to ensure that its independence is not undermined in this process.

75. The Committee is concerned at the fact that organizations of persons with disabilities are not taken into account or involved in the National Committee for Persons with Disabilities or in the performance of the functions of the Ombudsman.

76. The Committee recommends that the State party engage organizations of persons with disabilities in the national processes initiated by the National Committee for Persons with Disabilities and in the performance of the independent monitoring functions of the Ombudsman's Office.

Colombia (2016)

72. The Committee is concerned at the State party's failure to comply with its obligation under Statutory Act No. 1618 to designate an independent mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the Convention. It is also concerned that the Ombudsman's Office has assigned the defence of the rights of persons with disabilities to the Office of the Specialized Ombudsman for Health, Social Security and Disability, thereby reinforcing the medical model of disability.

73. The Committee recommends that the State party designate an independent mechanism for monitoring the Convention, in accordance with article 33 of the Convention and the Paris Principles, and that it acquire the material and human resources sufficient in quality and quantity to carry out its functions and involve organizations of persons with disabilities in fulfilling its mandate. It also encourages the State party to protect and promote the human rights of persons with disabilities.

[Ethiopia \(2016\)](#)

69. The Committee is concerned that the State party has not designated focal points in all branches of Government in order to mainstream disability issues across all policies and programmes. It notes with concern that the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission does not comply with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights (the Paris Principles). It is concerned at the absence of specific mechanisms for the participation of organizations of persons with disabilities in the monitoring of the Convention.

70. The Committee recommends that the State party designate focal points in all branches of Government to mainstream disability issues across all policies and programmes. It also recommends that the State party take all necessary measures to ensure the full compliance of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission with the Paris Principles. It further recommends that the State party ensure the full participation of organizations of persons with disabilities and civil society in the entire process of monitoring the implementation of the Convention, in particular through systematic consultation with the Human Rights Commission and the Ethiopian Institution of the Ombudsman.

[Guatemala \(2016\)](#)

76. The Committee notes that the State party is working to strengthen the focal point designated to monitor implementation of the Convention; however, it is concerned that this focal point does not have sufficient material resources and qualified human resources to perform its role. It is also concerned that no independent monitoring mechanism has yet been designated, as required under article 33 (2) of the Convention. Lastly, it is concerned by the inadequate participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the national implementation and monitoring process as a whole.

77. The Committee recommends that the State party expedite the adoption of legal reforms to strengthen the focal point and the institutions responsible for implementation of the Convention and allocate technical, material and financial resources to enable them to perform their role. It also recommends that the State party accelerate the process of designating an independent monitoring mechanism which satisfies the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (Paris Principles) and ensure that the mechanism has sufficient resources. Lastly, it recommends providing the necessary independent financial and material resources to increase the participation of organizations of persons with disabilities, in accordance with article 33 (3) of the Convention. It further recommends that the State party ensure that full consultations are held with all organizations of persons with disabilities, regardless of membership of the National Council for Persons with Disabilities.

[Italy \(2016\)](#)

81. The Committee is concerned at the lack of an independent and inclusive monitoring mechanism in line with article 33 (2) of the Convention.

82. The Committee recommends that the State party immediately establish and implement an independent monitoring mechanism that adheres to the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles), and that it provide adequate funding for its functioning and the full involvement of organizations of persons with disabilities in its work.

[United Arab Emirates \(2016\)](#)

61. The Committee is concerned:

(a) About the absence of high-level mechanisms to coordinate policy on the rights of persons with disabilities;

(b) That, in spite of the voluntary commitment made by the State party in the context of the universal periodic review in 2008 (see A/HRC/WG.6/15/ARE/1 and Corr.1, para. 10), the State party has not yet established a national human rights institution.

62. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Consider establishing a high-level focal point authority at the ministerial level to coordinate matters relating to the implementation of the Convention across all sectors and between different levels of government;

(b) Establish without further delay a monitoring mechanism compliant with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles) and ensure that organizations of persons with disabilities participate in its work.

Uruguay (2016)

67. Preocupa al Comité que la Comisión Nacional Honoraria de la Discapacidad desempeña al mismo tiempo la función del mecanismo de supervisión independiente y del mecanismo de implementación de la Convención.

68. El Comité recomienda al Estado parte que adopte medidas para designar un mecanismo de supervisión que se ajuste plenamente a los Principios de París.

Chile (2016)

67. El Comité observa que el Estado parte no ha designado al mecanismo independiente de supervisión del cumplimiento de esta Convención, y que no se ha definido el rol de la sociedad civil, particularmente de las organizaciones de personas con discapacidad, en la aplicación y la supervisión de dicho cumplimiento.

68. El Comité solicita al Estado parte que designe el mecanismo independiente que cumpla con los principios relativos al estatuto de las instituciones nacionales de promoción y protección de los derechos humanos (Principios de París), para la supervisión del cumplimiento de la Convención. Asimismo, le recomienda que involucre de manera importante a las organizaciones de personas con discapacidad, tanto en la implementación como en el monitoreo del cumplimiento de la Convención.

Lithuania (2016)

67. The Committee is concerned that:

(a) The Ministry of Social Security and Labour, which is in charge of coordinating implementation of the Convention, lacks the legal mandate, authority and human and financial resources to influence other ministries and State institutions and to coordinate effective implementation the Convention, and that there is no strong focal point within each ministry responsible for implementing the Convention;

(b) The Office of Equal Opportunities Ombudsperson and the Council for the Affairs of the Disabled, which have been appointed to function as the State party's independent monitoring mechanisms, are not in full compliance with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles), notably because the Council falls under the mandate of the Ministry of Social Security and Labour;

(c) There is lack of consultation and involvement of representative organizations of persons with disabilities in monitoring the implementation of the Convention.

68. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Immediately take the steps necessary to empower and enable the Ministry of Social Security and Labour to coordinate the implementation of the Convention, and establish strong and efficient focal points within each ministry and State institution responsible for implementing the Convention;

(b) Remove the Council for the Affairs of the Disabled from the independent monitoring framework and, in consultation with organizations of persons with disabilities, expedite the establishment of an independent monitoring mechanism that is in compliance with the Paris Principles and that has the required expertise and access to sufficient resources in accordance with article 33 (2) of the Convention;

(c) Adopt legislation to guarantee the full participation of representative organizations of persons with disabilities in the implementation, coordination and monitoring of the Convention.

Portugal (2016)

62. The Committee notes that the State party recently established the independent monitoring mechanism to promote, protect and monitor implementation of the Convention; however, it is concerned that the mechanism does not fully comply with the Paris Principles, and by the lack of funding allocated to it.

63. The Committee recommends that the State party adopts measures to ensure that the independent monitoring mechanism is in full compliance with the Paris Principles, in that no government representative should form part of it, ensure it has an adequate budget allocation to perform its duties, and that it work in close consultation with organizations of persons with disabilities.

Serbia (2016)

67. The Committee is concerned there is no coordination mechanism as outlined in art.33 para. 1. In addition the National Human Rights Institution does not act as an independent mechanism as outlined in art. 33 para. 2. The Committee is also concerned about the lack of information on the composition of the Council for Monitoring the implementation of UN Human Rights Mechanism Recommendations established in 2014 and the Council of the Government, and how and to what extent Civil Society takes part in them.

68. The Committee recommends the State party to ensure that independent organizations of persons with disabilities (DPOs) are systematically involved in the process of monitoring the Convention, and provide them with efficient budgetary support for this purpose.

Slovakia (2016)

87. The Committee notes with concern: (a) the limited capacity of the focal points and coordination mechanism; and (b) the absence of involvement and participation of organizations of persons with disabilities in monitoring the implementation of the Convention.

88. The Committee recommends that the State party build up the capacity of focal points and coordination mechanisms to perform their duties in accordance with article 33 (1) of the Convention and provide support for the mandatory participation of organizations of persons with disabilities in the monitoring of the implementation of the Convention.

Thailand (2016)

67. The Committee is concerned that the Department for the Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities lacks sufficient capacity and resources to fulfil its mandate. It is also concerned about the criteria for the appointment of "disability experts", as well as the lack of a clear role for representative organizations of persons with disabilities. The Committee is further concerned that the status of the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand was downgraded to "B".

68. The Committee recommends that the State party ensure that the Department for the Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities closely consults with organizations representing persons with disabilities nationwide to standardize the selection of "disability experts", to ensure the quality of the experts and an adequate representation of the interests of

persons with disabilities, especially women and girls with disabilities. The Committee also recommends that the State party develop a national action plan that incorporates a formal system of monitoring to ensure the implementation of the Persons with Disabilities Empowerment Act and other laws and policies relating to persons with disabilities. The State party is further encouraged to ensure the participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the monitoring of the implementation of the Convention. It calls on the State party to ensure that the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand fulfils the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles).

Uganda (2016)

64. The Committee is concerned about the lack of a strategy on the National Council for Disability to coordinate public policies in all areas covered by the Convention and that focal points have not been designated in all branches of government. It is also concerned about the insufficient resources given to the Uganda Human Rights Commission to fulfil its obligations as an independent monitoring body. It is further concerned at the absence of specific mechanisms for the participation of organizations of persons with disabilities and civil society in the entire process of monitoring the Convention, as set out in its article 33 (3).

65. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Expedite the process of appointing focal points within ministries and other government bodies, with sufficient funding, to enhance implementation of the provisions of the Convention and ensure accountability of government departments to mainstream rights of persons with disabilities;

(b) Strengthen the capacity of the Uganda Human Rights Commission with sufficient budgetary allocation and human resources to fulfil its mandate effectively and ensure the full participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the monitoring process, including by providing the necessary funding.

Brazil (2015)

59. The Committee is concerned that the National Council for the Protection of the Rights of People with Disabilities (CONADE) does not constitute an independent monitoring mechanism in accordance with the Paris Principles.

60. The Committee recommends that the State party establish an independent mechanism in line with the Paris Principles with the necessary resources to promote, protect and monitor implementation of the Convention, ensuring full participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations herein.

European Union (2015)

76. The Committee notes with concern that the European Union Framework for implementation and monitoring of the Convention is not fully in line with the Paris principles, nor is adequately resourced. Moreover, the European Commission is designated as both the focal point (art. 33.1) and part of the monitoring framework (art. 33.2).

77. The Committee recommends that the European Union take measures to decouple the European Commission's roles - by its removal from the independent monitoring framework - to ensure full compliance with the Paris principles, and that the latter has adequate resources to perform its functions. It further recommends that the European Union consider the establishment of an inter-institutional coordination mechanism and designation of focal points in each EU institution, agency and body.

Gabon (2015)

71. The Committee is concerned about the specific role and mandate of the National Committee on Insertion of Persons with Disabilities (foreseen in Decree n°52/PR/MSNASBE,

04/02/2002) in relation to article 33(1) and that it has not been created. In addition, the Committee is concerned at the lack of an independent monitoring mechanism, including measures to ensure the participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organisations.

72. The Committee recommends that the State party immediately designate bodies under article 33(1) and 33 (2). The latter adhering to the Paris Principles, as well as that it guarantee the meaningful participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organisations in all processes of the implementation and monitoring of the Convention.

Kenya (2015)

59. The Committee is concerned about the lack of clarity in the designation of a focal point or focal points for the implementation of the Convention within the government and a coordination mechanism. It is also concerned that the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights does not form part of the national mechanism for monitoring the Convention, and that the current mechanism does not comply with the Paris Principles. It is further concerned at the absence of specific mechanisms for the participation of civil society organizations in the entire process of monitoring the Convention, as set out in article 33, paragraph 3, of the Convention.

60. The Committee recommends that the State party ensure explicit appointment of the governmental body which is the focal point for the implementation of the Convention, and consider the appointment of a coordination mechanism under Article 33 (1) and elaborate concretely on its prerogatives. It also recommends that the State party establish a national mechanism to monitor the implementation of the Convention, with the participation of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights as institution in compliance with the Paris Principles, in line with article 33.2 of the Convention, and ensure the full participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the monitoring process, including by providing the necessary funding.

Mauritius (2015)

45. The Committee is concerned that while a coordination of the implementation of the Convention is addressed, no adequate monitoring mechanism involving persons with disabilities and their representative organizations has been established so far.

46. The Committee recommends that the State party designate an independent monitoring mechanism in conformity with the Paris Principles, ensuring that persons with disabilities and their representative organizations fully participate in the designation of the mechanism and monitoring the implementation of the Convention as required by article 33 (3).

Qatar (2015)

59. The Committee is concerned at the absence of high-level mechanisms to coordinate policy on the rights of persons with disabilities. The Committee is also concerned about the independence of the National Human Rights Commission, the insufficiency of resources to carry out its tasks in relation to the Convention, and the low level of engagement with organizations of persons with disabilities.

60. The Committee recommends that the State party consider establishing a high-level framework authority at the ministerial level to coordinate matters relating to the implementation of the Convention across all sectors and between different levels of government. The Committee also recommends that the State party provide the appropriate human and financial resources to the National Human Rights Commission and to ensure its continued adherence to the Paris Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions

(see General Assembly resolution 48/134, annex). It also recommends that the State party ensure that organizations of persons with disabilities participate with this authority.

Ukraine (2015)

60. The Committee notes with concern the lack of independent mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the rights of persons with disabilities. The Committee is also concerned that consultations of the civil society organizations working on the rights of persons with disabilities are not systematic and often formalistic.

61. The Committee recommends the State party to establish an independent body that should be entrusted with the mandate of the independent national monitoring mechanism in line with article 33, paragraph 2, of the Convention and in accordance with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (Paris Principles), with allocation of adequate financial and human resources. The Committee also recommends that the State party ensure that organizations of persons with disabilities and other civil society organizations working on the rights of persons with disabilities are de-jure involved on all legislative, financial and policy decisions that can have an impact on persons with disabilities.

Cook Islands (2015)

61. The Committee is concerned at the absence of an independent monitoring framework and the lack of civil society involvement.

62. The Committee recommends that the State party designate an independent monitoring framework aligned to the Paris Principles, with an allocated budget and ensure the participation of persons with disabilities as required by article 33(3).

Croatia (2015)

52. The Committee is concerned that the independent monitoring body, the ombudswoman for persons with disabilities, is not designated as such by law and that it has no outreach possibilities to rural areas. It is further concerned that DPOs and other civil society organisations are not sufficiently supported by the government to participate in national implementation and monitoring.

53. The Committee recommends the State party to ensure existence of an independent monitoring body in accordance with the Paris Principles by adopting appropriate legislation on the ombudsperson of persons with disabilities. It is further recommended to provide DPOs and other civil society organizations with adequate resources for full and effective participation in the national implementation and monitoring process.

Czech Republic (2015)

60. The Committee notes with concern the lack of independent national monitoring mechanism in line with article 33, paragraph 2, of the Convention.

61. The Committee recommends the State party that the Office of Ombudsperson should be entrusted with the mandate of the independent national monitoring mechanism in line with article 33, paragraph 2, of the Convention and in accordance with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (Paris Principles), with allocation of adequate financial and human resources.

Dominican Republic (2015)

62. El Comité observa que el Estado parte no ha designado al mecanismo independiente de seguimiento; también le preocupa el poco nivel de participación de las organizaciones de personas con discapacidad en los procesos de implementación y seguimiento de esta Convención.

63. El Comité recomienda al Estado parte:

(a) Designar en el más corto plazo el mecanismo independiente de supervisión de la Convención, en concordancia con el párrafo 33.2 y los Principios de París, y asigne los recursos necesarios para su funcionamiento; e

(b) Involucrar a las organizaciones de personas con discapacidad, tanto en los procesos de implementación de la Convención en concordancia con el artículo 33.1, como en el mecanismo designado según el párrafo 33.2 de la Convención.

[Germany \(2015\)](#)

61. The Committee is concerned that some focal points at the Länder level have not been formally designated as per the Convention requirements of article 33 (1) and that the State party does not provide the adequate resources on a permanent basis to support the independent monitoring mechanism's work according to article 33 (2).

62. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Consolidate the institutional structures in accordance with Article 33 (1) and formally implement the designation of focal points and their counterparts in the different areas of application of the Convention in all Länder;

(b) Reinforce the necessary resources and conditions for focal point independent activity, including the legal status of all Länder "Commissioners for Matters Relating to Disabled Persons";

(c) Strengthen the capacities of the independent monitoring mechanism according to art. 33 (2) ensure availability of resources for more comprehensive and effective monitoring at the Länder and municipal levels.

[Mongolia \(2015\)](#)

51. The Committee is concerned about the insufficient human, technical and financial resources allocated to foster a coherent national-level disability law and institutionalising policy changes for implementation of the Convention.

52. The Committee recommends that the State party specifically designate one or more national monitoring mechanisms in conformity with the Paris Principles to monitor implementation of the Convention. In doing so, the State party should ensure that this mechanism(s) is provided with adequate human, technical and financial resources. Furthermore, it is strongly recommended that specific measures be undertaken for ensuring the full participation of persons with disabilities through their representative organisations in monitoring the implementation of the Convention.

[Turkmenistan \(2015\)](#)

57. The Committee is concerned at the low attention paid to the involvement of organizations of persons with disabilities in the establishment and functioning of an independent monitoring mechanism. It is also concerned that the State party has not yet identified a focal point in line with article 33.1 of the Convention.

58. The Committee calls on the State party to expedite the establishment of an independent monitoring mechanism, with the active involvement of persons with disabilities and a focal point responsible for disability issues in accordance with the Convention and other international standards.

[Denmark \(2014\)](#)

66. While noting the operation of the State party's Interministerial Committee, the Committee is concerned that it seeks inputs from representative organizations of persons with disabilities in Denmark only occasionally, and that there is an absence of coordination

with the representative organizations of persons with disabilities in the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The Committee is also concerned at the absence of coordination and of independent monitoring mechanisms in the Faroe Islands.

67. The Committee recommends that the State party enable civil society and, in particular, representative organizations of persons with disabilities, to fully and regularly participate in monitoring of the implementation of the Convention. The State party should also take the necessary measures for the establishment or designation of a coordination mechanism, and of an independent monitoring mechanism, in the Faroe Islands. The Committee also recommends that the Government of the Faroe Islands establish a human rights institution for the promotion and protection of human rights, in accordance with the Paris Principles.

[Republic of Korea \(2014\)](#)

61. The Committee takes notes that the Bureau of Policy for Persons with Disabilities is in charge of the overall implementation of the Convention, the Policy Coordination Committee for Persons with Disabilities formulates, coordinates and monitors the implementation of basic policy on persons with disabilities, and the National Human Rights Commission of Korea provides advice or comments to the Policy Coordination Committee for Persons with Disabilities on the implementation of the Convention. However, the Committee is concerned that the Policy Coordination Committee for Persons with Disabilities is not functioning properly, and that the National Human Rights Commission of Korea lacks sufficient human and financial resources to monitor effectively the implementation of the Convention.

62. The Committee recommends that the State party ensure that the Policy Coordination Committee for Persons with Disabilities carries out its role of effective development and implementation of policies related to persons with disabilities, and provide the National Human Rights Commission of Korea with sufficient human and financial resources to monitor effectively the implementation of the Convention. The Committee also recommends that the State party adopt legal provisions to ensure the full participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the monitoring of the implementation of the Convention.

[Belgium \(2014\)](#)

48. The Committee is concerned that the Interfederal Centre for Equal Opportunities, which is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Convention, appears to lack the independence required by the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles).

49. The Committee recommends that the State party complete the process to ensure the Centre's compliance with the Paris Principles.

[Ecuador \(2014\)](#)

54. The Committee is concerned that the Ombudsman's Office does not form part of the national mechanism for monitoring the Convention, which is made up of the Council for Citizen Participation and Social Control and the Centre for Citizen Monitoring of Respect for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Ecuador. The Committee is also concerned at the absence of specific mechanisms for the participation of civil society organizations in the entire process of monitoring the Convention, as set out in article 33, paragraph 3, of the Convention.

55. The Committee reminds the State party that the national monitoring mechanism must be independent and carry out specific tasks related to promotion, protection and monitoring the implementation of the Convention. In this context, the Committee urges the State party to adopt the necessary legal measures to clearly establish the independent

mechanism under the Convention in line with the Paris Principles, strengthen its capacities with the necessary budget and resources to fulfil its mandate effectively and ensure the full participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations in the monitoring process.

Mexico (2014)

61. The Committee notes that despite the establishment of an independent mechanism to monitor the implementation of the Convention in Mexico, its structure, functions and activities have not been defined with regard to the promotion, protection and monitoring of the rights enshrined in the Convention at the federal and state levels.

62. The Committee urges the State party to ensure that the National Human Rights Commission and the 32 state human rights entities, as the independent monitoring mechanism for the Convention, define the mechanism's structure, goals, indicators and resources. Moreover, the State party should strengthen the National Commission so that it may fulfil its mandate effectively and independently.

Sweden (2014)

61. The Committee is concerned that the State party has not yet introduced an independent mechanism based on the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights (Paris Principles) to monitor the implementation of the Convention. The Committee is further concerned that coordination responsibility lies with the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs instead of the ministry responsible for human rights and discrimination.

62. The Committee recommends that the State party establish an independent monitoring mechanism to fulfil effectively the obligation enshrined in the Convention in accordance with the Paris Principles.

Costa Rica (2014)

65. Al Comité le preocupa que el Estado parte no haya designado puntos focales relacionados con la aplicación de la Convención y la ausencia de consulta con organizaciones de personas con discapacidad en esta materia. Preocupa al Comité que no se haya establecido el mecanismo independiente de seguimiento que cumpla con los Principios de París, así como la escasa participación de la Defensoría de los Habitantes en esta función.

66. El Comité llama al Estado parte a establecer o designar los puntos focales encargados de la implementación de la Convención en consulta con las organizaciones de personas con discapacidad y en caso de que decida establecer mecanismos de coordinación para dicho fin. El Comité urge al Estado parte que designe un mecanismo independiente de monitoreo, que cumpla con los Principios de París y que fortalezca sus capacidades con presupuesto y recursos adecuados para garantizar efectivamente su mandato.

Australia (2013)

57. The Committee is concerned that Australia lacks a participatory and responsive structure for the implementation and monitoring of the Convention in line with Article 33.

58. The committee recommends the State party to immediately set up a monitoring system that would be fully in line with the provisions of art.33 of the Convention.

Austria (2013)

52. The Committee observes the creation of the "Independent Monitoring Committee for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities"

as Austria's article 33(2) independent monitoring mechanism. However, the Committee is concerned that the monitoring committee does not have its own budget and it appears to lack the independence required by the Principles relating to the status and functioning of national institutions for protection and promotion of human rights (Paris Principles).

53. The Committee recommends that the full independence of the independent monitoring committee be guaranteed in accordance with the Paris principles. The Committee further recommends that the Länder create their own independent monitoring mechanisms to further coordinate disability policies and practices throughout Austria.

54. The Committee recommends that the Independent Monitoring Body be allocated a transparent budget and be given the power to administer that budget autonomously.

[El Salvador \(2013\)](#)

67. The Committee is concerned that the National Council for Persons with Disabilities still does not meet the requirements of the Convention regarding implementation mechanisms.

68. The Committee recommends that the State party establish a system for the implementation of the Convention fully in line with the provisions of article 33 of the Convention.

69. The Committee is concerned that the State party has not set up a framework to oversee the implementation of the Convention.

70. The Committee recommends that the State party officially designate mechanisms to monitor the implementation of the Convention in the country, involving both civil society and an institution fulfilling the Paris Principles regarding independent human rights institutions.

[Paraguay \(2013\)](#)

75. The Committee notes the creation of the Secretariat for the Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities (SENADIS), whose mandate is to coordinate policy on the rights of persons with disabilities in consultation with the National Commission on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CONADIS). It is nevertheless concerned that SENADIS has been given the task of implementation and independent monitoring even though it does not comply with the Paris Principles.

76. The Committee recommends that the State party set up an independent mechanism in compliance with the Paris Principles, with the necessary resources to monitor implementation of the Convention; that mechanism should be in permanent consultation with disabled persons' organizations at the national level.

77. The Committee is concerned at the lack of information in the State party on progress made with implementation of articles 17 (protecting the integrity of the person), 20 (personal mobility), 22 (respect for privacy) and 23 (respect for home and family).

78. The Committee asks the State party to include in its next periodic report exhaustive information on measures taken to guarantee those rights and to protect them and ensure their implementation.

[Argentina \(2012\)](#)

51. The Committee notes with concern that the National Advisory Commission on the Integration of Persons with Disabilities (CONADIS) is not of a sufficiently high institutional rank to effectively carry out its duties as a mechanism for facilitating and coordinating matters relating to the implementation of the Convention at all levels and in all sectors of government. The Committee also notes with concern that the National Disability Observatory, which is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Convention, is a subsidiary body of CONADIS, in violation of article 33, paragraph 2, of the Convention and the Paris Principles.

52. The Committee recommends that the State party raise the institutional rank of CONADIS and endow it with the human and financial resources it needs in order to effectively fulfil its mandate to coordinate the implementation of the Convention at all levels and in all sectors of government. The Committee urges the State party to designate an independent national oversight mechanism that is in full compliance with the Paris Principles and to provide guarantees, as a matter of priority, for the full participation of persons with disabilities and the organizations that represent them in the oversight process.

[China \(2012\)](#)

49. The Committee is concerned at the overall absence of independent bodies and DPOs systematically involved in the implementation process of the CRP. Considering that the China Disabled Persons' Federation remains the sole official representative of persons with disabilities in the state party, the Committee is concerned about the participation of civil society. In addition the Committee wonders which body or organization in China is designated the independent national monitoring mechanism as required by art. 33 (2) CRPD.

50. The Committee strongly recommends that the state party revise article 8 of the Law on the Protection of Disabled Persons, thus allowing non-governmental organizations other than the China Disabled Persons' Federation to represent the interests of disabled people in the state party and be involved in the monitoring process. It further recommends the establishment of an independent national monitoring mechanism in line with Art 33 (2) CRPD and in accordance with the Paris Principles.

[Hong-Kong \(2012\)](#)

83. The Committee is worried by the low rank of the focal point, the Commissioner for Rehabilitation and the lack of an independent monitoring mechanism according to article 33 (2).

84. The Committee recommends that Hong Kong, China, strengthen the authority of the Commissioner for Rehabilitation and set up an independent monitoring mechanism that involves the active participation of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations.

[Hungary \(2012\)](#)

51. In spite of the efforts the State party has taken to put in place a monitoring mechanism for implementation of the Convention, the Committee is concerned that the National Disability Council, which has been designated to function as an independent monitoring mechanism, is not in compliance with the Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles) and, hence, not in line with article 33(2) of the Convention.

52. The Committee calls upon the State party to set up an independent monitoring mechanism in accordance with the Paris Principles and article 33(2) of the Convention, and to ensure the full participation of civil society, especially organizations of persons with disabilities, in the monitoring process and framework.

[Peru \(2012\)](#)

48. The Committee is concerned at the lack of clarity as to the functions and division of responsibilities of Multi-Sectoral Permanent Commission and CONADIS, as well as the fact that they are not compliant with the Paris Principles.

49. The Committee recommends that the State party specifically designate a national monitoring mechanism that is in conformity with the Paris Principles, and ensure, as a matter of priority, the full participation in the monitoring process of persons with disabilities and their representative organizations.

Tunisia (2010)

41. The Committee takes note of the existence of specialized institutions mandated to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, namely the Higher Council for the Social Advancement and Protection of Persons with Disabilities and the Higher Committee for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. However, it is concerned by the low participation of persons with disabilities in, and the independence of, these institutions.

42. The Committee recommends that the State party:

(a) Ensure that disabled persons' organizations are able to participate in the Higher Council for the Social Advancement and Protection of Persons with Disabilities, and thus play a central role in monitoring the implementation of the Convention;

(b) Ensure that the Higher Committee for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms complies with the Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (see General Assembly resolution 48/134, annex), and establish a dedicated unit on disabilities.